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The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) deems an individual
inadmissible to the United States for having engaged in terrorist
activity. Both "engaged in terrorist activity" and "terrorist activity"
are terms of art that are broadly defined under the INA to include
activity that courts, scholars, and advocates agree stretches the
definition of terrorism. An individual found inadmissible on terrorism-
related grounds is barred from nearly all forms of immigration relief
including adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident, refugee
status, asylum, withholding of removal, and cancellation of removal.
These INA provisions, meant o exclude terrorists from accessing
immigration relief have been perversely interpreted to deny relief to
individuals who have taken actions in self-defense, although state and
federal courts, state constitutions, and scholars alike describe self-
defense as a right so fundamental as to be inherent. There is no
principled reason to deny noncitizens the right to present a self-
defense justification with respect o acts that may otherwise qualify as
terrorist activity in the immigration context. In fact, when properly
interpreted, the INA as currently written already excludes force used
in self-defense from the definition of terrorist activity; the challenge
lies in the fact that the current exclusion is too burdensome for
adjudicators to apply properly and too narrow to shield all individuals
who have taken actions in self-defense from being denied immigration
relief Given this perplexing state of affairs, Congress hould adopt
reforms to ensure that the government does not deny immigration
relief to individuals who have exercised the most basic of rights that
of self-preservation. These reforms can accomplish two desired
immigration law goals: excluding terrorists and providing protection
to individuals fleeing persecution.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 17, 2011, Libyans engaged in mass protests against the
repressive forty-two-year rule of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.' The protests soon
evolved into the First Libyan Civil War as various opposition groups engaged in
an armed struggle against Gaddafi's regime.2 Forces loyal to the Gaddafi regime
attempted to regain control of opposition-held areas through the indiscriminate
firing of weapons, including rockets and cluster bombs, into residential
neighborhoods and other areas.3 To protect his community against the violence
of Gaddafi's armed forces and other armed groups during the civil war, Adam
and other young men from his community formed a neighborhood self-defense
unit.4 On more than one occasion, pro-regime groups attacked his community
and forced Adam to defend himself by shooting at the assailants. Armed groups
opposing the government later kidnapped, detained, brutally beat, and threatened
Adam. Eventually, Adam fled to the United States to seek safety through asylum.
The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Adam asylum after finding that the self-
defense unit was a terrorist organization and that Adam had engaged in terrorist
activity as defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) when he used
a dangerous device with the intent of causing death or physical injury.5 The IJ
rejected Adam's argument that he did not engage in terrorist activity because he
acted in self-defense, holding that neither involuntariness nor duress were
exceptions to the terrorism bar. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
affirmed the IJ's ruling denying Adam asylum, and he was deported to Libya.
1. AMNESTY INT'L, NO PLACE OF SAFETY: CIVILIANS IN LIBYA UNDER ATTACK 2 (2011).
2. See id.
3. Id
4. Adam is a former client of the Center for Applied Legal Studies at Georgetown University
Law Center, where the author previously worked as a Clinical Teaching Fellow and Supervising
Attorney. To protect Adam's privacy, this Article has altered his name and other facts.
5. The IJ also found that Adam had engaged in terrorist activity because he received military-
type training from the self-defense unit and provided the unit "material support" as defined in the INA.
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Like Adam, Enders joined the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) to protect his
community in Ethiopia. The OLF sought to protect the Oromo people's rights
from the Ethiopian government, where successive regimes have oppressed and
persecuted the Oromo people.6 Enders informed the general public about the
OLF's mission, recruited members, and solicited funds for the OLF.7 On two
occasions, the government detained Enders for twenty-five and forty-five days,
respectively.8 During these detentions, government agents interrogated Enders
about his involvement with the OLF and repeatedly beat and brutalized him.9
Eventually, Enders fled to the United States, where he sought safety through
asylum. At his asylum hearing, Enders admitted to knowing that some OLF
factions engaged in armed resistance against he Ethiopian government.'0
The IJ found that Enders was ineligible for asylum because he had engaged
in terrorist activity by soliciting funds and members for the OLF, which the IJ
deemed a terrorist organization as defined by the INA." The BIA affirmed the
IJ's decision denying Enders asylum.' 2 Enders filed a petition for review with
the Ninth Circuit, where he argued that the OLF could not be a terrorist
organization because the organization's actions against the Ethiopian
government were based on self-defense.13 The Ninth Circuit denied his
petition.' 4 Years later, on October 2, 2013, the Acting Secretary of Homeland
Security exercised his discretionary authority under the INA to grant an
exemption from the terrorism-related inadmissibility grounds (TRIG) to
applicants for voluntary activities and associations relating to the OLF.
Specifically, the Acting Secretary determined that the TRIG would not apply to
those, like Enders, who had solicited funds or members, provided material
support, or received military-type training from, or on behalf of, the OLF."
Enders himself was ineligible for this exemption.16
The reach of the TRIG extends far beyond Enders and Adam. Other
persecuted individuals who use force in self-defense are also at risk of being
denied immigration relief for having engaged in "terrorist activity." Vigilante
6. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 6, Abdu v. Holder, 345 F. App'x 295 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 06-
71098).
7. Id
8. Id. at 6-7.
9. Id. at 6.
10. Id. at 7.
11. Id. at 4.
12. Abdu, 345 F. App'x at 296.
13. Petitioner's Opening Brief, supra note 6, at 11.
14. Abdu, 345 F. App'x at 297.
15. See Exercise of Authority Under Section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act 1 (Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/legal-
docs/October_2_2013_ExerciseofAuthorityOLF.pdf [https://perma.cc/HGC2-T4CT].
16. The exemption specifically excluded individuals who had "been placed in removal
proceedings unless such proceedings were terminated prior to an entry of an order of removal for reasons
unrelated to potential eligibility under this Exercise of Authority." Exercise of Authority Under Section
212 (d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, at 3.
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mobs burned entire Rohingya villages and shot Rohingya villagers at random in
Burma.' 7 If the Rohingya had shot members of the mob to protect themselves,
the government would deem them inadmissible under the TRIG and deny them
refugee status in the United States. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
captured and enslaved countless Yazidi women in Iraq.' 8 If any of these women
had banded together and used a weapon or dangerous device (even a sharp rock)
to knock their captors unconscious to escape, the government would also deem
them inadmissible under the TRIG and deny them immigration status in the
United States.
Immigration adjudicators have interpreted the TRIG to bar immigration
relief to individuals who have taken actions in self-defense, despite the fact that
state and federal courts, state constitutions, and scholars alike have described
self-defense itself as an inherent, natural, or inalienable right. 19 Based on the
importance of self-defense, as recognized under both state and federal law, there
is no principled reason to deny individuals the right to argue that acts that may
qualify as terrorist activity were justified by self-defense in the immigration
context. In fact, when properly interpreted, the INA as currently written excludes
actions taken in self-defense from the definition of "terrorist activity." The
opening clause of the definition describes "terrorist activity" as any activity that
is "unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if it
had been committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of
the United States or any State)."2 0 Because actions taken in self-defense are
lawful activity, they are necessarily excluded from the definition of "terrorist
activity" in the INA. However, the current exclusion requires immigration
adjudicators to engage in a burdensome analysis-determining whether the
activity meets self-defense requirements of federal law, the laws of each of the
fifty states, and the law of the place where the activity was committed. The
analysis is also too limited to protect all individuals who have acted in self-
defense from being denied immigration relief for having engaged in terrorist
activity. This Article recommends a broader self-defense exclusion to the TRIG
that both excludes terrorists2' from obtaining immigration status and prevents
17. Rohingya Exodus Amid Ethnic Cleansing in Myanmar, AMNESTY INT'L (Sept. 14, 2017),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/roMhingya-exodus-amid-ethnic-cleansing-in-
myanmar/ [https://penna.cc/4YV3-P78R].
18. Skye Wheeler, Yezidi Women After Slavery: Trauma, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 18, 2016),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/18/yezidi-women-after-slavery-trauma [https://perma.cc/5SX8-
UFPX].
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).
21. In this Article, terrorists and terrorism used without quotation marks refer to the common
understanding of those terms. "Engage(d) in terrorist activity" or "terrorist activity" (used with or
without quotation marks) refers to the statutory definitions of those terms in INA section




the United States from denying immigration relief to noncitizens who have acted
in self-defense.
Part I of this Article describes the current statutory framework supporting
the TRIG, the wide-reaching immigration consequences of the TRIG, and the
limited waivers available for those found inadmissible under the TRIG. Part II
summarizes the right to self-defense and explains how it is an essential right
under the common law, federal law, and the laws of all fifty states. Part II further
explores how self-defense has been discussed in BIA and immigration-related
federal courts of appeal cases. Part III describes the INA's current self-defense
exclusion and how it is too burdensome and narrow to effectively shield all
individuals who have acted in self-defense from denial of immigration relief.
Part III further tackles anticipated arguments against applying self-defense to the
TRIG. Finally, Part IV concludes with suggested reforms to immigration law to
ensure that no noncitizen is denied immigration relief for having engaged in the
most elemental of rights: self-preservation.
I.
THE TERRORISM-RELATED INADMISSIBILITY GROUNDS (TRIG)
Popular conceptions of terrorism entail violent activity or the threat of such
activity to achieve political ends. Dictionary definitions of terrorism include "the
use of violence and threats to intimidate or coerce, especially for political
purposes."22 By contrast, the INA's definition of "terrorist activity" requires no
such political motivations. In fact, courts, scholars, and advocates have all agreed
that the TRIG stretch the definition of terrorism and have resulted in many
innocent individuals, even victims of terrorism, being denied immigration relief
in the United States.23 This Section will summarize the current TRIG, describe
the harsh immigration consequences for an individual deemed inadmissible
under one of the TRIG, and explore the limited waivers available for those swept
under the TRIG.
22. Terrorism, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/terrorism?s=t
[https://perma.cc/6XQV-DUMB].
23. See Hussain v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 534, 537 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[The INA's terrorism-related]
definitions are broad .... "); McAllister v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 444 F.3d 178, 187 (3d Cir.
2006) ("[W]e concede that the INA's definition of 'terrorist activity' certainly encompasses more
conduct than our society, and perhaps even Congress, has come to associate with traditional acts of
terrorism, e.g., car bombs and assassinations...."); Geoffrey A. Hoffman & Susham M. Modi, The
War on Terror as a Metaphor for Immigration Regulation: A Critical View of a Distorted Debate, 15 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 449, 467-69 (2012) ("The terrorism-related grounds ... are detailed and
exhaustive; the definition of 'terrorist activity' is breathtakingly broad."); HUM. RTS. FIRST, DENIAL
AND DELAY: THE IMPACT OF THE IMMIGRATION LAW'S "TERRORISM BARS" ON ASYLUM SEEKERS
AND REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2009),
https://web.archive.org/web/20190614102323/http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/RPP-DenialandDelay-FULL-111009-web.pdf ("[T]housands of legitimate
refugees who pose no threat to the United States have had their applications for asylum, permanent
residence, and family reunification denied or delayed due to overly broad provisions of U.S. immigration
law that were intended to protect the United States against terrorism.").
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A. Current TRIG Statutory Framework
INA section 212(a)(3)(B)(i) deems inadmissible any noncitizen who
(1) has "engaged in terrorist activity"; (2) "a consular officer, the Attorney
General, or the Secretary of Homeland Security knows, or has reasonable ground
to believe, is engaged in or is likely to engage after entry in any terrorist activity";
(3) has incited "terrorist activity"; (4) is a representative of a terrorist
organization or a group that endorses or espouses "terrorist activity"; (5) is a
member of a Tier I or II terrorist organization; (6) is a member of a Tier III
terrorist organization, "unless the [noncitizen] can demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that the [noncitizen] did not know, and should not
reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization";
(7) endorses or espouses "terrorist activity" or persuades others to do so or to
support a terrorist organization; (8) has received military-type training from a
terrorist organization; or (9) is the spouse or child of anyone found inadmissible
under the TRIG within the last five years.2 4
A noncitizen is also inadmissible under INA section 212(a)(3)(F) if the
Secretary of State or Attorney General (AG), in consultation with the other,
determines that the noncitizen has "been associated with a terrorist organization
and intends while in the United States to engage solely, principally, or
incidentally in activities that could endanger the welfare, safety, or security of
the United States."25
"Terrorist activity" is in turn defined in INA section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii) as
any activity "which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed
(or which, if it had been committed in the United States, would be unlawful under
the laws of the United States or any State)."26 It involves a series of six different
types of activity, including, fifth, the use of any biological or chemical agent,
nuclear weapon or device, explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous
device with the intent to endanger the safety of one or more individuals or to
cause substantial damage to property, and, sixth, a threat or attempt to do any of
the listed activity. The fifth provision resulted in the denial of asylum to Adam
and would result in the denial of refugee status to the Rohingya villagers and
Yazidi women described above for their use of self-defense.
INA section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv) defines "engage in terrorist activity" in part
as being directly involved in terrorist activity, either "in an individual capacity"
or "as a member of an organization," by (1) committing or inciting to commit,
under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily
injury, a "terrorist activity"; (2) preparing or planning a "terrorist activity"; or
(3) gathering information on potential targets for "terrorist activity."27 Actions
that further terrorist activity or benefit terrorist organizations or its members also
24. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i).
25. INA § 212(a)(3)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(F).
26. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).
27. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv).
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qualify as engaging in terrorist activity. These actions include (1) soliciting funds
or other things of value for a "terrorist activity" or a Tier I, II, or III terrorist
organization; (2) soliciting any individual to engage in "terrorist activity," or for
membership in a Tier I, II, or III terrorist organization; or (3) committing an act
that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords "material support" for
the commission of a "terrorist activity," to any individual who the actor knows,
or reasonably should know, has committed or plans to commit a "terrorist
activity," or to a Tier I, II, or III terrorist organization or any member of such an
organization.28
Lastly, the INA describes three "tiers" of terrorist organizations. Tier I
terrorist organizations are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance
with INA section 219,29 which requires the Secretary to find (1) that the
organization is a foreign organization, (2) that it engages in terrorist activity as
defined by INA section 212(a)(3)(B) or retains the capability or intent o engage
in terrorist activity or terrorism, and (3) that the activity or terrorism threatens
United States nationals or the national security of the United States.30 Currently
designated Tier I organizations include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), al-Qa'ida, Boko Haram, and ISIS.31 A Tier II terrorist
organization is an organization designated by the Secretary of State after a
finding that the organization engages in "terrorist activity" as defined by INA
section 212(a)(3)(B).32 Designated Tier II organizations include the Lord's
Resistance Army and Turkish Hizballah.33 Tier III terrorist organizations are
defined as "a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which
engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in" "terrorist activity" as defined
by INA section 212(a)(3)(B).34 Tier III terrorist organizations are known as
"undesignated terrorist organizations" because, unlike Tier I and II terrorist
organizations, they are defined by their activity alone without undergoing a
formal designation process. The IJs deemed Adam's self-defense unit and the
organization that Enders supported, the OLF, Tier III terrorist organizations.35
28. Id These latter three actions do not qualify with respect to a Tier III terrorist organization if
the noncitizen "can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that [they] did not know, and should
not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization." Id
29. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I).
30. INA § 219(a)(1), 8 U.S.C § 1189(a)(1).
31. See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF
COUNTERTERRORISM, https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/ [https://penna.cc/4LCL-
LU3A] (providing a full list of all current foreign terrorist organizations).
32. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II). Unlike for Tier I terrorist
organizations, the designation process for Tier II terrorist organizations is not fully laid out in the INA.
Nevertheless, the State Department follows a similar procedure. See Terrorist Exclusion List, U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123086.htm
[https://perma.cc/35XV-QNS7].
33. See Terrorist Exclusion List, supra note 32.
34. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III).
35. See Petitioner's Opening Brief, supra note 6, at 4.
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Unlike Tier I and II determinations, immigration adjudicators determine
whether a group is a Tier III organization on a case-by-case basis, in connection
with the review of an application for an immigration benefit.36 Thus, a wide
range of immigration adjudicators, including consular officers, asylum and
refugee officers, and immigration judges, can deem an organization a Tier III
organization.37 Because the determination is made on a case-by-case basis, an
immigration adjudicator may deem an organization a Tier III organization in one
case but not in another.38
The Tier III scheme has been criticized for both "adopt[ing] a stunningly
broad definition of terrorism and . .. let[ting] low-level officials decide on an ad
hoc basis whether a foreign group is a 'terrorist organization,' even if the group
doesn't appear on any government list." 39 In fact, under the scheme, "[t]wo ...
teenagers who planned to smash up a storefront with a baseball bat for kicks
would likely qualify as a Tier III terrorist group." 40 The breadth of the INA's
definitions of "terrorist activity" and terrorist organizations is particularly
problematic given the harsh immigration consequences of the TRIG.
B. Immigration Consequences ofthe TRIG
The immigration consequences of the TRIG at INA sections 212(a)(3)(B)
and 212(a)(3)(F) are extensive. As grounds of inadmissibility, the TRIG make
noncitizens ineligible for visas and admission to the United States as either
nonimmigrants or immigrants through the denial of either a visa or entry into the
United States at a border.41 Noncitizens "described in" either ground are also
removable from the United States42 and subject to mandatory detention during
their removal proceedings.43 Noncitizens who are found inadmissible or
removable under terrorism-related grounds are also ineligible for nearly all forms
36. See A.A. v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 973 F.3d 171, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2020); Uddinv.
Att'y Gen. of the United States, 870 F.3d 282, 285 (3d Cir. 2017).
37. For a thorough discussion of how IJs determine whether an organization qualifies as a Tier
III terrorist organization, see Denise Bell, Tier III Terrorist Organizations: The Role of the Immigration
Court in Making a Terrorist Determination, 10 IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR, July 2016, at 1,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/880381/download [https://perma.cc/D3P4-VKNB].
38. See, e.g., Uddin, 870 F.3d at 285("[S]omething is amiss where, time and time again, the
Board finds the BNP is a terrorist organization one day, and reaches the exact opposite conclusion the
next.").
39. Jesse Lempel, Tier III Terrorist Designations: The Trump Administration and Courts Move




41. See INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
42. INA § 237(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B).
43. INA § 236(c)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(D); id § 236A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a).
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of immigration relief, including refugee status,44 asylum,45 withholding of
removal,46 adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident,47 cancellation of
removal,48 temporary protected status (TPS),49 T nonimmigrant status,50 U
nonimmigrant status,5' and voluntary departure.5 2
Deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) is one of
the only forms of immigration relief available to those who are inadmissible
44. INA § 207(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1). The association with TRIG at INA section
212(a)(3)(F) may be waived for refugees "for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it
is otherwise in the public interest." INA § 207(c)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3).
45. INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v). Individuals who are "described in"
INA section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV) (a representative of a terrorist organization or a group that endorses or
espouses terrorist activity, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)) may be granted asylum if the AG determines
"that there are not reasonable grounds for regarding the [noncitizen] as a danger to the security of the
United States." INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v).
46. Withholding of removal is a mandatory form of relief that an IJ must grant to an individual
who establishes that their life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of removal on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. INA
§ 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(b)(3)(A). If "there are reasonable grounds to believe" an individual is
a "danger to the security of the United States," they are barred from receiving withholding of removal.
See id. § 241(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(b)(3)(B). The statute mandates that an individual "described in"
INA section 237(a)(4)(B), which deems individuals who are in turn "described in" any of the TRIG at
INA sections 212(a)(3)(B) or 212(a)(3)(F) removable, "shall be considered to be a[] [noncitizen] with
respect to whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the United
States."
47. INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).
48. INA § 240A(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(4). Cancellation of removal is available in removal
proceedings for both lawful permanent residents (LPRs) and non-LPRs; both types result in the
cancellation of removal and the grant of lawful permanent residence. INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(a) (LPRs); INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (non-LPRs).
49. INA § 244(c)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2)(B)(ii). The secretary of homeland security
may designate a country for TPS due to temporary conditions in that country-such as ongoing armed
conflict, an environmental disaster, or other extraordinary conditions that prevent the country's
nationals from returning safely or where the country is unable to handle the return of its nationals
adequately. INA § 244(b)(1), 8 U.S.C § 1254a(b)(1).
50. 8 C.F.R. § 212.16(b) (2020). T nonimmigrant status may be granted to certain victims of a
severe form of trafficking who have assisted law enforcement in the investigation or prosecution of
trafficking. INA § 101 (a)(15)(T), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T). While some grounds of inadmissibility
are waivable for applicants for T nonimmigrant status, the TRIG are not included. INA § 212(d)(13)(B),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(13)(B).
51. U nonimmigrant status may be granted to certain victims of crime who have suffered
physical or mental abuse and have been, are, or will be helpful to law enforcement or government
officials investigating or prosecuting the crime. INA § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U).
Applicants otherwise eligible for U nonimmigrant status may apply for a waiver of the TRIG. INA
§ 212(d)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(14).
52. INA § 240B(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Voluntary departure allows
an individual who is otherwise removable to depart the country, at their own expense and within a
designated period of time, without an order of removal. INA § 240B(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229c(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Voluntary departure is preferable to a formal order of removal because the
individual may be able to reenter the country legally later without facing the bars of entry relating to
those who have final orders of removal.
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under the TRIG.53 Deferral of removal under the CAT is granted to an individual
who has been ordered removed but has proven that they are more likely than not
to be tortured in the country of removal.54 This is an extremely limited form of
relief: the government may remove the individual to any country other than the
one where they are more likely than not to be tortured, the relief will not
necessarily result in the individual's release from detention, and the relief may
be terminated if conditions in the country of removal change such that the
individual is no longer more likely than not to be tortured there. 5 CAT relief is
not a grant of lawful immigration status and can never lead to permanent
residency or naturalization. 56
C. Waivers of the TRIG under INA § 212(d)(3)(B)(i)
Recognizing the TRIG's breadth, Congress included a scheme in the INA
through which certain grounds may be waived.57 However, the scheme and its
implementation have several significant limitations that have hindered its ability
to truly protect noncitizens impacted by the TRIG's sweeping scope. First, only
the secretaries of state and homeland security may authorize waivers. Second,
there is no formal process for applying for waivers for individuals not in removal
proceedings; for those in removal proceedings, the process for obtaining a waiver
cannot begin until after the individual receives a final order of removal. Finally,
the government can take years to adjudicate waiver requests. These limitations,
each discussed in turn, mean that many individuals have no available waiver, and
even those who are eligible for a waiver are left in vulnerable positions for years.
INA section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) grants the secretaries of state and homeland
security, in consultation with the AG, the "sole unreviewable discretion" to
authorize exemptions from certain sections of INA section 212(a)(3)(B).58
However, the following individuals remain ineligible for any waiver: members
or representatives of Tier I or II terrorist organizations, individuals who
voluntarily and knowingly engaged in (or endorsed, espoused, or persuaded
others to endorse, espouse, or support) "terrorist activity" on behalf of a Tier I or
II terrorist organization, and individuals who voluntarily and knowingly received
military-type training from a Tier I or II terrorist organization.59
53. 8 C.F.R. § 208.17 (2020). In addition to deferral of removal under CAT, the TRIG also do
not bar applications for naturalization. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMM[GR. SERVS., TERRORIST-RELATED
INADMISSIBILITY GROUNDS (TRIG) INSTRUCTOR GUIDE 6 (2012),
https://www.aila.org/File/DownloadEmbeddedFile/82777 [https://penna.cc/9YFA-RY7Q].
54. 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(a).
55. Id § 208.17(b), (d)(4).
56. See id § 208.17(b)(1)(i).
57. INA § 212(d)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(B). This waiver was expanded in 2007 to
include nearly all of the TRIG under section 212(a)(3)(B). See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 691, 121 Stat. 1844, 2364 (2007) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 &
note).
58. INA § 212(d)(3)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(B)(i).
59. INA § 212(d)(3)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(B)(i).
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Using INA section 212(d)(3)(B)(i)'s grant of authority, the Secretary of
Homeland Security has exempted the following acts from INA section
212(a)(3)(B): (1) "material support" provided under duress to a terrorist
organization;60 (2) solicitation under duress of funds or other things of value for
a terrorist organization; 61 (3) receipt of military-type training under duress from,
or on behalf of, a terrorist organization;62 (4) provision of medical care to
individuals that the noncitizen knew, or reasonably should have known,
committed or planned to commit a "terrorist activity," or to members of a
terrorist organization;63 (5) provision of certain limited "material support" to a
Tier III terrorist organization or to a member of such an organization;64 and
(6) provision of insignificant "material support" to a Tier III terrorist
organization or to a member of such an organization.65
INA section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) further grants the Secretaries of State and
Homeland Security the discretion to exempt an entire group from the Tier III
60. Exercise of Authority Under Sec. 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(Feb. 26, 2007), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/legal-
docs/2.26%20excersise%20of%20authority.pdf [https://penna.cc/ZM4A-CTEK] (for undesignated
terrorist organizations); Exercise of Authority Under Sec. 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (Apr. 27, 2007),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/news/Duress_Waiver_27ap07.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A4GV-UMT3] (for designated terrorist organizations).
61. Exercise of Authority Under Section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,419 (Mar. 16, 2011).
62. Exercise of Authority Under Section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,418 (Mar. 16, 2011).
63. Exercise of Authority Under Section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/legal-
docs/10%2013%20exercise%20authority voluntary%o20provision%20medical%20care.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TQ6X-UK46].
64. Exercise of Authority Under Section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 6914, 6914 (Feb. 5, 2014). This exemption includes certain routine commercial
transactions, certain routine social transactions, certain humanitarian assistance, and material support
provided under substantial pressure that do not rise to the level of duress ("sub-duress pressure"). Id;




65. Exercise of Authority Under Section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 6913, 6913 (Feb. 5, 2014). The Secretary has also exercised discretion not to apply
the terrorism bars to certain noncitizens who participated in the Iraqi uprisings against the government
of Saddam Hussein in Iraq from March 1 through April 5, 1991, Exercise of Authority Under Section
212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 1 (Aug. 17, 2012),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/legal-docs/Iraqi%20Uprisings.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7MKG-N3SJ], and for certain noncitizens with existing immigration benefits who
were currently inadmissible under INA section 212(a)(3)(B)(i), Exercise of Authority Under the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,821, 49,821 (Aug. 17, 2012). In two executive orders,
President Trump directed the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, in consultation with the AG,
to consider rescinding the exercises of authority relating to the TRIG. See Exec. Order No. 13,769, sec.
6, 3 C.F.R. § 272 (2018); Exec. Order No. 13,780, sec. 7, 3 C.F.R. § 301 (2018). They did not rescind
the exemptions before the end of the Trump administration. On his first day in office, President Biden
revoked this and other executive orders. Proclamation No. 10,141, 86 Fed. Reg. 7005 (Jan. 25, 2021).
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terrorist organization definition, except where such a group is one that "has
engaged [in] terrorist activity against the United States or another democratic
country or that has purposefully engaged in a pattern or practice of terrorist
activity that is directed at civilians." 66 The Secretaries of State and Homeland
Security, in consultation with the AG, have granted group-based exemptions to
over thirty-five organizations.67
IJs cannot grant waivers under INA section 212(d)(3)(B) because the INA
gives the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security the "sole unreviewable
discretion" to authorize such exemptions.68 The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) will not consider a waiver for an individual in removal
proceedings until they receive an administratively final order of removal.69 At
that time, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of the
Chief Counsel handling the case will forward it to U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) for exemption consideration.70 This will occur
only if the IJ denied relief solely on a ground of inadmissibility for which the
Secretaries have xercised exemption authority.71 For individuals who are not in
removal proceedings, there is no formal process for applying for a waiver,
leaving advocates with no choice but to make ad hoc requests.72
66. INA § 212(d)(3)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(B)(i).
67. Terrorism-Related Inadmissibility Grounds (TRIG) - Group-Based Exemptions, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/laws-and-policy/other-resources/terrorism-
related-inadmissibility-grounds-trig/terrorism-related-inadmissibility-grounds-trig-group-based-
exemptions [https://penna.cc/44BB-TZ6V].
68. INA § 212(d)(3)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(B)(i).
69. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
IMPLEMENTS EXEMPTION AUTHORITY FOR CERTAIN TERRORIST-RELATED INADMISSIBILITY
GROUNDS FOR CASES WITH ADMINISTRATIVELY FINAL ORDERS OF REMOVAL 1 (2008),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/fact-sheets/USCIS_Process_Fact_Sheet_-
Cases_in_Removal_Proceedings.pdf [https://perma.cc/TE8W-ACT5]. The waiver is available only to
individuals who were issued a final order of removal on or after September 8, 2008. Id Removal orders
are generally deemed administratively final if the BIA has either affirmed an order of removal or the
period in which the individual may seek review of the order has expired. Id For the history of DHS's
implementation of the waiver process and a discussion of its flaws, see HUM. RTS. FIRST, supra note 23,
at 41-47, 55-59.
70. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 69.
71. Id
72. See Sesay v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 787 F.3d 215, 223 n.7 (3d Cir. 2015)
("[A]lmost ten years after Congress granted the Executive Branch the power to grant waivers, there
remains no published process for requesting one, although as represented by government counsel,
numerous requests have been granted through ad hoc submissions to counsel for the Department of
Homeland Security."); Anwen Hughes, Thomas K. Ragland & David Garfield, Combatting the
Terrorism Bars Before DHS and the Courts, in IMMIGRATION PRACTICE POINTERS 450, 457 (2010-
2011 ed. 2010) ("There was (and is still) no formal procedure for 'applying' for an exemption; USCIS
determined that it was capable of identifying and adjudicating exemption-eligible cases onits own, and
this remains the procedure.").
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As of September 30, 2017, USCIS had granted ninety-two TRIG
exemptions and denied sixteen for individuals in removal proceedings.73 For
individuals not in removal proceedings, USCIS had granted 22,981 exemptions,
denied 197, and left 1,169 cases impacted by TRIG on hold.74
Advocates have criticized the waiver scheme provided in the INA for a
number of reasons. Common critiques include that it is unduly cumbersome and
inadequate, that it causes years-long delays in applications, that it leaves all
impacted applicants in protracted states of limbo and some in lengthy detention,
and that it results in prolonged separation between applicants and family
abroad.75
Although adjudicators, such as the IJ in Adam's case, have found that self-
defensive force falls under the gambit of "terrorist activity," there is currently no
exemption for such force. This absence of protection may be because the
application of self-defense in immigration cases, as explained below in Part II,
has rarely been addressed.
II.
SELF-DEFENSE AND TERRORISM
Part I described the current TRIG and the wide range of consequences that
result from a finding that an individual is inadmissible under those grounds,
including mandatory detention, denial of nearly all forms of immigration relief,
and removal from this country. This Section explores how criminal law self-
defense theories may apply in immigration cases where an individual is accused
of engaging in "terrorist activity" or other violent activity. It begins with an
overview of self-defense, including a summary of its origin, parameters, and its
status under federal and state law. It then concludes with a discussion of how the
federal courts of appeals and the BIA treat self-defense in immigration cases.
Although this Article focuses on self-defense in the criminal context, because
that is where the defense has developed, self-defense is also available as a
defense in civil actions.76




75. See HUM. RTS. FIRST, supra note 23, at 7-11.
76. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Drug Enf't Agency, 14 F. App'x 994, 995 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
self-defense did not justify a DEA agent's actions in a claim brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act).
The parameters of the civil law defense are virtually the same as the criminal law defense. See Caroline
Forell, What's Reasonable?: Self-Defense and Mistake in Criminal and Tort Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 1401, 1403 (2010) ("With little or no consideration of the different purposes for criminal and
tort law, the requirements for self-defense in tort law follow those in criminal law.").
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A. Self-Defense as a "Justification" Defense
Under criminal law, self-defense belongs to the realm of "justification"
defenses, or defenses that define otherwise criminal conduct "which under the
circumstances is socially acceptable and which deserves neither criminal liability
nor even censure."77 Thus, successful invocation of ajustification defense proves
that conduct by the defendant that would have normally been deemed unlawful
was in fact lawful.78 Justification defenses are often contrasted with "excuse"
defenses, in which the defendant admits to committing unlawful conduct but
asserts that they should not be punished for it because of an extenuating
circumstance, such as duress or insanity.79 By contrast, justified conduct is
"conduct that is 'a good thing, or the right or sensible thing, or a permissible
thing to do."'8 0
B. Self-Defense as an Essential Right
Scholars have described self-defense as a federal constitutional right
(rooted in the Second Amendment),8' as a human right,8 2 and, most often, as an
innate or natural right. 83 While the Supreme Court has never explicitly stated that
self-defense is a constitutional right,84 it has described it as a "basic right,
77. Peter D. W. Heberling, Note, Justification: The Impact of the Model Penal Code on
Statutory Reform, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 914, 916 (1975); see also John L. Diamond, An Ideological
Approach to Excuse in Criminal Law, 25 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 2-3 (1999)
("Justifications ... exonerate an actor's use of force against another because the conduct is 'justified' or
appropriate under the circumstances. The actor has behaved properly, potentially for the public good,
and there is no reason to criminalize his behavior." (footnote omitted)).
78. See 2 PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 121 (2020) ("Justification defenses
describe conduct that, if not justified, would constitute an offense but if justified, does not constitute
criminal or wrongful conduct.").
79. See Diamond, supra note 77, at 3 ("'Excuses' are not instances where the actor behaved
properly or desirably, but rather, situations in which society excuses a defendant for wrongful behavior
due to extenuating circumstance, like insanity or duress." (footnotes omitted)).
80. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 204 (7th ed. 2015) (quoting J. L.
Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 PROC. ARISTOTELEAN SOC'Y 1 (1957), reprinted in FREEDOM AND
RESPONSIBILITY 6, 6 (Herbert Morris ed., 1961)).
81. See, e.g., Kindaka Sanders, A Reason to Resist: The Use ofDeadly Force in Aiding Victims
of UnlawfulPoliceAggression, 52 SANDIEGOL. REV. 695,704-10 (2015) (describingthe constitutional
basis for the right to self-defense); Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh
Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852, 910 (2013) ("It is apparent that he
common law right to self-defense is constitutionalized to some degree.").
82. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant, & Joanne D. Eisen, The Human Right of Self-
Defense, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 43, 130 (2007) ("If any principle of international human rights law can be
discerned from the universal agreement of major legal systems, it is the right of self-defense.").
83. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, The Natural Right ofSelf-Defense: Heller's Lessonfor the World,
59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 235, 240-43 (2008) (examining the natural law roots of the right to self-defense);
Shlomit Wallerstein, Justifying the Right to Self-Defense: A Theory of Forced Consequences, 91 VA. L.
REV. 999, 1027 (2005) ("Starting from the premise of an absolute unqualified right not to be killed, it
follows that self-defense, as a derivative right, must be an absolute natural right as well.").
84. Darrell A. H. Miller, Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and the State, 80 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 85, 85 (2017) ("Self-defense often is described as being innate, inalienable, and individual. But
the Supreme Court has never expressly held self-defense to be a constitutional right.").
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recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day"85 that
is also "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."86 In another case,
the Supreme Court referred to self-defense as both an "inherent right" and a
"natural right."87 Unlike federal law, twenty-one state constitutions have
provisions recognizing self-defense as an inherent, natural, or inalienable right. 88
Maine's Constitution declares that self-defense is inherent, natural, and
inalienable: "All people are born equally free and independent, and have certain
natural, inherent and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and
defending life and liberty . . . ."89 It is clear that self-defense is essential under
both federal and state law.
C. The Elements of Self-Defense
Modern self-defense laws are derived from the common law. 90 At common
law, the privileged use of force in self-defense provided a complete defense to
crimes like murder, voluntary manslaughter, assault and battery, and attempted
murder.9' The common law generally permitted the use of force in self-defense
when the actor possessed a reasonable belief that force was necessary to protect
against the imminent use of unlawful physical force against themself by an
aggressor. 92 The law only authorized the use of deadly force in self-defense when
the actor reasonably believed that its use was necessary to prevent imminent and
unlawful use of deadly force by an aggressor.93 An initial aggressor did not have
the right to use self-defense.94 An actor had no duty to retreat before using non-
deadly force in self-defense; however, prior to using deadly force in self-defense,
the law generally required the actor to "retreat to the wall" (i.e., as far as they
could without putting themself in danger). 95 However, some jurisdictions under
the common law allowed an actor to use deadly force in self-defense even when
they could retreat in complete safety without using such force. 96 An actor was
85. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010).
86. Id at 768 (quoting Washingtonv. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
87. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 585, 628 (2008).
88. See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights of Self-Defense and Defense of Property,
11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 399, 401-07 (2007) (collecting state constitutional provisions relating to self-
defense and cases interpreting these provisions).
89. ME. CONST. art. I, § 1.
90. Miller, supra note 84, at 87-95 (describing the history of the common law right to self-
defense).
91. RUSSELL L. WEAVER, LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, JOHN M. BURKOFF, & CATHERINE
HANCOCK, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS & PROBLEMS 458-59 (3d ed. 2009).
92. Id at 459.
93. DRESSLER, supra note 80, at 223.
94. Id
95. 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 216 (2020).
96. WEAVER ET AL., supra note 91, at 479 ("At common law, a person who could safely retreat
was not required to run away before using nondeadly force. Perhaps in the frontier spirit, many
jurisdictions also allowed a defendant to use deadly force for self-protection even though [they] could
have retreated safely without using the lethal force.").
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never required to retreat prior to using deadly force in self-defense if the assailant
attacked the actor in their home.97
Because of variations across common law definitions, the Model Penal
Code (MPC) proposed a uniform definition to determine when force is justified
by self-defense. Under the MPC, force is justified in self-defense "when the actor
believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting
[themself] against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present
occasion." 98 The MPC permits the use of deadly force in self-defense only when
"the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect [themself] against
death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force
or threat." 99
Today, each of the fifty states permits non-deadly and deadly force in self-
defense. Forty-five states have entirely or partially codified this right,'00 while
courts in four states-Maryland, Rhode Island, Virginia, and West Virginia-
have continued to apply the self-defense justification that existed under their
common law.101 While no federal statute codifies the right to self-defense,102
97. Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 237, 242-43 (2008) (describing the general duty to retreat and the castle doctrine at common
law).
98. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (Westlaw through 2019 Annual Meeting of American Law
Institute).
99. Id § 3.04(2)(b).
100. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (2015 & Supp. 2020); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.81.330-.340 (2020);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-404 to -406 (2020); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-606 to -607, -614 (2013 &
Supp. 2019); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 197-198.5 (West 2014 & Supp. 2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-
704 (2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-19 (2019 & Supp. 2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 464-465
(2015); FLA. STAT. § 776.012 (2020); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-21, -23.1 (2019); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 703-304 to -305 (2020); IDAHO CODE § 18-4009 (2016 & Supp. 2020); id §§ 19-202, -203 (2017 &
Supp. 2020); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-1 (West 2016); IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2 (2020); IOWA
CODE §§ 704.1-.2A, .3 (2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-5221 to -5222, -5224, -5230 (Supp. 2020); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 503.050, .070 (West2016); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:19-:20, :22 (2016); ME. STAT.
tit. 17-A, § 108 (2020); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 8A (2018); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.06-.065 (2020);
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-3-15 (2020); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 563.011, .031 (Supp. 2020); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 45-3-101 to -102, -110 (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-1409, -1414 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 193.240, 200.120-130, .160, .200, .275 (2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:4 (2016); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2C:3-4 to -5, -9 (West 2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-7 (2020); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15
(McKinney 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-51.2-.3 (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-03 to -04, -07
to -07.1, -12 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2901.05, .09 (LexisNexis 2014); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 643 (2018 & Supp. 2020); id § 733 (2015); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.209, .219 (2019); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 505-06 (2020); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-440 (2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-5-9, 22-16-
34 to -35 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-11-611 to -612 (2018); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 9.31-.33
(West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402 (LexisNexis Supp. 2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2305
(LEXIS through Act 1 of 2021 Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.16.020, .050 (2020); WIS. STAT.
§ 939.48 (2019-20); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-502, -602 (2019).
101. Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 396, 403-04 (Md. 2000); State v. D'Amario, 568 A.2d 1383, 1385
(R.I. 1990); Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 234 S.E.2d 286, 290 (Va. 1977); State v. Harden, 679
S.E.2d 628, 641 (W. Va. 2009).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Tunley, 664 F.3d 1260, 1262 n.3 (8th Cir. 2012) ("Self-defense
as a justification for killing is not codified by federal statute, but is instead a 'basic right, recognized by
2021 ] 631
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
federal courts have nonetheless looked to the common law to recognize the
availability of self-defense as a justification for federal crimes.103
While federal law and the laws of all fifty states recognize the right to use
force in self-defense, the exact parameters of the defense vary from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. However, a number of elements from the common law-
including the requirements of unlawfulness, necessity, imminence, and
proportionality-are commonly seen across jurisdictions. In addition, some
jurisdictions continue to impose the common law duty to retreat before using
deadly force, while others have implemented "stand your ground" provisions.
This Section summarizes each of these key elements under both state and federal
law. Because the right to self-defense is not codified in federal law, model
criminal jury instructions produced by several federal courts of appeals are
examined below when discussing the justifiable use of force under federal law.
1. Unlawfulness of Force
The unlawfulness element requires that the aggressor's initial threat of
force against the actor must have been unlawful or unjustified, i.e., criminal or
tortious.104 Thus, an arrestee cannot use force in self-defense when a police
officer uses justified force to effect an arrest.105 While most jurisdictions
incorporate this element when describing situations in which force is justified, a
few jurisdictions fail to include it.1 06
2. Reasonable Belief in Necessity of Force
The necessity element requires that the actor use force "only when and to
the extent necessary" to protect themself.107 In addition, the actor's belief in the
necessity of force to protect themself must be subjectively and objectively
many legal systems from ancient times to the present day."' (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561
U.S. 742, 767 (2010))
103. See, e.g., United States v. Waldman, 835 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2016) ("While 18 U.S.C.
§ 111 does not explicitly address self-defense, when a statute is silent on the question of affirmative
defenses, we are to effectuate the defense as 'Congress may have contemplated it,' looking to the
common law as a guide." (quoting Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 13-14 (2006))).
104. WEAVER ET AL., supra note 91, at 459, 472. The MPC defines "unlawful force" as "force,
including confinement, that is employed without the consent of the person against whom it is directed
and the employment of which constitutes an offense or actionable tort or would constitute such offense
or tort except for a defense (such as the absence of intent, negligence, or mental capacity; duress; youth;
or diplomatic status) not amounting to a privilege to use the force." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11(1)
(Westlaw through 2019 Annual Meeting of American Law Institute).
105. ROBiNSON, supra note 78, § 131(b)(2); WEAVER ET AL., supra note 91, at 472. Some
jurisdictions disallow self-defense even in the case of an unlawful arrest. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 703-304(4)(a). The MPC adopts this rule as well. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(a)(i).
106. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-19 (2019 & Supp. 2020).
107. ROBINSON, supra note 78, § 121(a)(2) (footnotes omitted).
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reasonable.108 In many states, necessity and the reasonableness of the actor's
belief are explicit requirements in their self-defense statutes. 109
Under federal law, the placement of "necessary" varies across model jury
instructions. The First and Third Circuits' model instructions do not include a
necessity requirement at all, thus allowing the use of force even when it is
unnecessary so long as the actor met the other requirements.o The Sixth and
Tenth Circuits' model instructions use "necessary" only in reference to the
amount of force used; therefore, an actor may use force even when it is
unnecessary so long as the amount of force used was reasonable. I The Seventh
and Eleventh Circuits' model instructions include "necessary" to describe the
need to use force but are silent on whether the amount of force used must be
necessary, unless, in the Seventh Circuit, it is deadly force." 2 The Fifth and
Ninth Circuits' model instructions employ "necessary" to describe both the need
to use force and the amount of force used. "1 3
108. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4(c) (3d ed. 2017 & Supp. 2020).
109. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(b) (West 2019) ("[A] person is justified in using
force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately
necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force."); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-2-402(2)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2020) ("An individual is justified in threatening orusingforce
against another individual when and to the extent that he individual reasonably believes that force or a
threat of force is necessary to defend the individual or another individual against the imminent use of
unlawful force.").
110. Unlike the model instructions of the other courts of appeals, the model instructions of the
First and Third Circuits both include a duty to retreat under the First it is described as a "reasonable
opportunity to escape, or otherwise frustrate the threat," PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR
THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT § 5.04 (U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF ME. 2019),
while under the Third it is a "reasonable, lawful opportunity to avoid the threatened harm," MODEL
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT § 8.04 (COMM. ON
MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITHIN THE THIRD CIRCUIT 2018) that may serve a similar
function as a "necessity" requirement.
111. See PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 6.06(2) (SIXTH CIRCUIT COMM. ON
PATTERN CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2019) ("A person is entitled to defend [themself] against the
immediate use of unlawful force. But the right to use force in self-defense is limited to using only as
much force as reasonably appears to be necessary under the circumstances."); CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 1.28 (CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 2011) (same).
112. THE WILLIAM J. BAUER PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT § 6.01 (COMM. ON FED. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 2020) ("A
person may use force when [they] reasonably believe[] that force is necessary to defend
[themself/another person] against the imminent use of unlawful force. [A person may use force that is
intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if [they] reasonably believes that force is
necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to [[themself]; someone else].]" (fourth and sixth
alterations in original)); ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS §§ 01.1-.2 (CRIMINAL
CASES) (COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE JUD. COUNCIL OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
2020) ("[Y]ou can't find that a forcible assault occurred if you believe that he Defendant acted only on
a reasonable good-faith belief that self-defense was necessary to protect against an assault by a private
citizen....").
113. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) § 1.39 (COMM. ON PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS DIST. JUDGES ASS'N FIFTH CIRCUIT 2019) ("The use of force is justified when a person
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3. Imminence of Force
Most jurisdictions require that the threat of force by the aggressor against
the actor was "imminent."" 4 The reasoning for this requirement is that if an
attack is not imminent, there may be other ways for the actor to avoid harm than
by injuring or killing the aggressor.15 However, if the attack is "imminent," the
actor does not have alternative options; therefore, the use of force is necessary
and justified."1 6 For this reason, some argue that the imminence requirement is
more properly understood as a modification of the necessity rule." 7
Scholars have criticized the way the imminence requirement has been
applied to victims of domestic violence who use deadly force against their
abusers. "' Such relationships involve cyclical and inevitable, but not always
imminent, violence. However, the imminence requirement limits the availability
of a self-defense justification for victims who take action when the abuser is not
immediately attempting to harm them. Thus, victims who kill abusers during a
lull in the abuse cannot assert self-defense, even though the abuse will continue
at some later point. 119 For this reason, some scholars have advocated for the
abolition of the imminence requirement.2 0 Professor Richard Rosen argued,
"Because imminence serves only to further the necessity principle, if there is a
conflict between imminence and necessity, necessity must prevail. If action is
really necessary to avert a threatened harm, society should allow the action, or
at least not punish it, even if the harm is not imminent." 121 Therefore, Professor
Rosen argued that an abuse victim should be permitted to use deadly force if
reasonably believes that force is necessary for the defense of oneself or another against the immediate
use of unlawful force. However, a person must use no more force than appears reasonably necessary
under the circumstances."); MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT
COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT § 6.08 (NINTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM. 2020) (same).
114. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (2015 & Supp. 2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704
(2020); FLA. STAT. § 776.012 (2020); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-1 (West 2016).
115. LAFAVE, supra note 108, § 10.4(d).
116. ROBINSON, supra note 78, § 131(b)(3); WEAVER ET AL., supra note 91, at 464; Richard A.
Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 371, 380
(1993).
117. ROBINSON, supra note 78, § 131(b)(3) ("Although the word 'imminent' appears to modify
the nature of the triggering conditions, it seems, and the drafters of the Model Penal Code agree, that the
restriction is more properly viewed as a modification of the necessity requirement. That is, as a practical
matter, actions taken in the absence of an imminent threat may not be necessary." (footnote omitted));
Rosen, supra note 116, at 380 ("In self-defense, the concept of imminence has no significance
independent of the notion of necessity.").
118. See Rosen, supra note 116, at 410-11, 410 n.102.
119. See Jane Campbell Moriarty, "While Dangers Gather": The Bush Preemption Doctrine,
Battered Women, Imminence, and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 2
(2005) ("Many courts decide as a matter of law that abattered woman who kills has no right to introduce
evidence relevant to self-defense if she does not kill her abuser at the exact moment the attack is
occurring.").
120. See, e.g., Jeffrey B. Murdoch, Comment, Is Imminence Really Necessity? Reconciling
Traditional Self-Defense Doctrine with the Battered Woman Syndrome, 20 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 191, 217-
18 (2000); Fritz Allhoff, Self-Defense Without Imminence, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1527, 1552 (2019).
121. Rosen, supra note 116, at 380.
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such force was necessary, even if the harm was not imminent at the very moment
that they used the force.' 22
4. Proportionality
"Proportionality" requires that the amount of force used by the actor must
have been reasonable in relation to the harm the aggressor threatened to use
against them.123 Thus, an actor may not use deadly force (usually defined as force
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury) in self-defense if the aggressor
threatened to use non-deadly force against them.'2 4 Jurisdictions use different
language to convey the requirement of proportionality.2 5 Moreover, many
jurisdictions do not explicitly mention the amount of force that self-defense
justifies; however, most jurisdictions do have provisions specifying when deadly
force is or is not justified.126 These provisions are essentially based on the idea
of proportionality.
5. Aggressor and Provocateur Limitations
The law completely bars certain actors from invoking self-defense to justify
their actions. The most common bar found in modern self-defense statutes is the
limitation on an initial aggressor's right to invoke the defense.27 In addition,
122. See id
123. LAFAVE, supra note 108, § 10.4(b).
124. Id
125. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(c) (2020) ("A person is justified in using reasonable force
against any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes
to be the imminent use of unlawful force."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07 (2012) ("An individual is
not justified musing more force than is necessary and appropriate under the circumstances."); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 2305 (LEXIS through Act 1 of 2021 Sess.) ("If a person kills or wounds another under
any of the circumstances enumerated below, [they] shall be guiltless ... in the just and necessary defense
of the person's own life .... ").
126. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-19 (2019 & Supp. 2020) ("[D]eadly physical force
may not be used unless the actor reasonably believes that such other person is (1) using or about to use
deadly physical force, or (2) inflicting or about to inflict great bodily harm."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 464 (2015) ("The use of deadly force is justifiable under this section if the defendant believes that such
force is necessary to protect the defendant against death, serious physical injury, kidnapping or sexual
intercourse compelled by force or threat.").
127. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704(3)(b) (2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
19(c)(2); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21(b)(3) (2019); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-1(b) (West 2016);
ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 108(1)(B) (2020); MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031(1) (Supp. 2020); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 627:4(I)(b) (2016); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(1)(b) (McKinney 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-05-03(2)(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402(2)(a)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2020).
An initial aggressor may regain the right to use force if they withdraw from the encounter
and effectively communicate that to the other person, but the latter person nevertheless continues or
threatens the use of unlawful physical force. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704(3)(b); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-19(c)(2); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21(b)(3); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-1(b); ME.
STAT. tit. 17-A, § 108(1)(B); MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031(1); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:4(I)(b); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 35.15(1)(b); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-03(2)(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-
402(2)(a)(iii).
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many statutes disallow the justification of self-defense when an actor, with the
intent to cause physical injury or death, provoked the use of force.128
6 Duty to Retreat
Under common law, an actor had a duty to retreat as far as they could prior
to using deadly force in self-defense.129 Today, a number of jurisdictions
continue to apply this rule.130 However, even in these jurisdictions, the duty is
not imposed unless there is a place of complete safety to which the actor can
retreat.131 Some jurisdictions have expanded the traditional duty to retreat to
require the actor to take additional measures before using deadly force in self-
defense. For instance, the actor may need to "surrender[] possession of property
to a person asserting aclaim of right thereto, or . .. comply[] with a demand that
[they] abstain" from performing an act which they are not obliged to perform.132
Under federal law, only the First and the Third Circuits' model jury
instructions impose a duty to retreat before using lethal force if there is a
reasonable opportunity to escape. 133 The Third Circuit's instructions further
require that the actor did not recklessly put themself in a situation where they
would be forced to use lethal force.134
128. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(c)(1) (2015 & Supp. 2020); ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.81.330(a)(2) (2020); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-404(B)(3) (2020); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-
606(b)(1) (2013 & Supp. 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704(3)(a); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
19(c)(1); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21(b)(1); ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 108(1)(A); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
1409(4)(a) (2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:4(I)(a).
Some jurisdictions allow the provocateur to regain the right to use force under the same
conditions as an aggressor. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-404(B)(3)(a); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-
611(e)(2) (2018); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(b)(4) (West 2019).
129. C.J.S. Homicide, supra note 95, § 216.
130. DRESSLER, supra note 80, at 230.
131. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.335(b); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-607(b); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-19(b).
132. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-19(b); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-607(b)(2); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 464(e)(2) (2015); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-304(5)(b) (2020); ME. STAT. tit. 17-A,
§ 108(2); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:4(111); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4(b)(2)(b) (West 2015). These
statutes follow the MPC, which does not permit deadly force in self-defense if
the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by
retreating orby surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a claim of right thereto
or by complying with a demand that he abstain from any action that he has no duty to take.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii) (Westlaw through 2019 Annual Meeting of American Law
Institute).
133. PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE FIRST
CIRCUIT § 5.04 (U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF ME. 2019); MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT § 8.04 (COMM. ON MODEL CRIM. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS WITHIN THE THIRD CIRCUIT 2018).





Even in jurisdictions that do impose a duty to retreat, there is a universally
accepted exception known as the "castle" doctrine. Under this exception, the law
does not impose a duty to retreat when the actor is in their home, even if they
know of a place to which they can retreat in complete safety.135 Generally, the
exception does not apply if the actor was the initial aggressor.136 At least one
jurisdiction continues to specify that the exception does not apply if a co-
occupant attacked the actor at home.137 This is a limitation that most other
jurisdictions have abandoned because of concerns that it places victims of
domestic violence in dangerous positions.138
b. "Stand Your Ground" Provisions
Today, many jurisdictions have replaced the common law duty to retreat
with "stand your ground" provisions.139 These provisions allow an actor to use
deadly force when threatened with an unlawful deadly attack, even if they are
aware of a place to which they can retreat in complete safety.140 Generally, these
provisions apply to situations where an actor used lethal force in self-defense and
at the time they were not engaged in unlawful conduct, they were in a place
where they had a right to be, and they did not provoke the attack."'
In summary, although the exact parameters of self-defense vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, every state and federal law permits the use of both
deadly and non-deadly force in self-defense. This is unsurprising given that self-
defense is often described as an inherent or natural right. However, despite the
universal recognition of self-defense, its application to immigration cases is
unclear.
D. Self-Defense in Immigration Cases
The federal circuit courts and the BIA have rarely addressed the issue of
whether an individual can raise self-defense in immigration cases. The two
federal circuit courts that have addressed the issue (the Third and the Ninth
Circuits) have agreed that noncitizens can raise self-defense in immigration
135. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:4 111(a); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4(b)(2)(b); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a) (McKinney 2009).
136. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-19(b); ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 108(2)(C)(3)(a).
137. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2)(b)(2) (2012).
138. See Widdison v. State, 410 P.3d 1205, 1210-11 (Wyo. 2018) (acknowledging that "[t]he
majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue conclude that a cohabitant does not have a duty
to retreat in his own home when, through no fault of his own, he is assailed by another cohabitant" and
adopting the majority rule in part because such a rule better protects victims of domestic violence).
139. LAFAVE, supra note 108, § 10.4(f).
140. Id. ("The majority of American jurisdictions holds that the defender (who was not the
original aggressor) need not retreat, even though he can do so safely, before using deadly force upon an
assailant whom he reasonably believes will kill him or do him serious bodily harm." (footnote omitted)).
141. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 776.012(2) (2020); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-440(C) (2020); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-11-611(d) (2018); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(e) (West 2019).
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cases.142 By contrast, the BIA has twice stated that noncitizens cannot use self-
defense to justify actions that otherwise qualify as "terrorist activity" under the
INA. 143 However, the BIA cases did not involve traditional uses of self-defense,
and the BIA's statements regarding self-defense in those cases can be
characterized as dicta. It, therefore, remains an open question whether the BIA
would hold that self-defense does not apply to an individual's use of force in a
traditional self-defense case (e.g., that of the Yazidi women or Rohingya
refugees described in the Introduction).
1. McAllister v. Attorney General of the United States
In McAllister v. Attorney General of the United States, the Third Circuit
reviewed a BIA decision in which it had found McAllister ineligible for asylum
and removable for having "engaged in terrorist activity."1 44 On appeal to the
Third Circuit, McAllister argued that the INA's definition of terrorist activity at
INA section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii) was unconstitutionally overbroad because it
encompassed common crimes that no reasonable person would consider to be
terrorist acts.145 In support of his argument, McAllister provided three
hypothetical examples of conduct, two of them relevant here, which he claimed
would unconstitutionally fall under the statutory definition of "terrorist
activity."146 The relevant examples were a boy who carries a baseball bat o
defend himself against bullies and a woman who uses kitchen utensils to protect
herself from domestic violence. 147 The Third Circuit found that neither situation
would constitute "terrorist activity" under the INA because "both the little boy
and the battered wife have acted in self-defense, which negates the 'unlawful'
element" of INA section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii),148 which provides that "terrorist
activity" is any activity "which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it
is committed (or which, if it had been committed in the United States, would be
unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State)."149
142. McAllister v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 444 F.3d 178, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2006);
Vukmirovic v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2004).
143. In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 941 (B.I.A. 2006), overruled on other grounds by Matter
of Negusie, 28 I. & N. Dec. 120 (A.G. 2020); Matter of A-C-M-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 303, 304 (B.I.A. 2018).
144. 444 F.3d at 181. McAllister was a citizen of Northern Ireland and a member of the Irish
National Liberation Army (INLA). As an INLA member, he was involved in two incidents that led the
IJ to deem him ineligible for asylum for having "engaged in terrorist activity": first, he acted as an armed
look-out while other INLA members used firearms to shoot a police officer, and second, he was a
member of a conspiracy to shoot and kill another police officer. Id at 181-82. He and his wife fled
Northern Ireland after loyalist forces and the police subjected them to violent attacks, including attacking
their home with gunfire and throwing his wife out of a moving vehicle while she was pregnant. Id at
182. The Third Circuit agreed that McAllister was ineligible for asylum for having "engaged in terrorist
activity." Id at 191.
145. Id at 185.
146. Id at 186.
147. Id
148. Id at 186-87.
149. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).
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2. Vukmirovic v. Ashcroft
In Vukmirovic v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a BIA decision in
which it affirmed the IJ's denial of Vukmirovic's application for asylum and
withholding of removal because he had engaged in the persecution of others on
the basis of race and religion.15 0 The persecutor bar is separate from the TRIG
and prevents the grant of asylum or withholding of removal to "any person who
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any
person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion."' 5 ' Vukmirovic was a Bosnian Serb from Bosnia-
Herzegovina.5 2 He joined a group that was formed to defend his Serbian town
against attacks.153 During Vukmirovic's time, the group defended the town from
Bosnian Croats, who often committed violence against the Serbs.'5 4 When
Croats entered his town, members of the group would defend it.' 5 During these
skirmishes, Vukmirovic admitted to physically attacking and harming Croats.156
He explained that "most" of these skirmishes occurred when the Croats
attacked.15 1
The IJ held that Vukmirovic's "use of the word 'most' [led] the court to
believe that [he] also attacked the Croats. Even though some of these action [sic]
occurred in self-defense, there is no provision under the law that exempts acts of
self-defense from qualifying as persecution since the state of mind of the
individual is irrelevant."158 The Ninth Circuit found that the IJ erred as a matter
of law when he held that acts of self-defense constituted persecution under the
INA, explaining that such an interpretation would contradict the purpose of the
statute because, among other things:
It would deny asylum to any victim of oppression who had the temerity
to resist persecution by fighting back. The right of self-defense is one of
the most ancient in Anglo-American law. As the English poet John
Dryden observed, "[S]elf-defense is nature's eldest law." William
Blackstone described self-defense as one of the "absolute rights of the
individual." 159
The court remanded the decision so that the IJ could conduct a new hearing
and render a decision applying the proper legal analysis.160
150. Vukmirovic v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1247, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 2004).
151. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).





157. Id at 1250.
158. Id (third alteration in original) (quoting IJ decision).
159. Id at 1252 (citation omitted).
160. Id at 1253.
2021 ] 63 9
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
3. Matter of S-K-
In contrast to the decisions in McAllister and Vukmirovic, the BIA has
stated that a noncitizen cannot use self-defense as a justification for TRIG
charges. In the case Matter of S-K-, the applicant, a Christian citizen of Burma
and member of the Chin ethnic group, donated money to the Chin National Front
(CNF), an organization that fought to secure the freedom of the Chin people.161
S-K- fled to the United States after the Burmese military confiscated goods she
attempted to donate to the CNF and the military learned of her identity.162 The
IJ found that S-K- had established a well-founded fear of persecution to qualify
for asylum but denied her application after finding that the CNF was a Tier III
organization and that S-K- had provided material support to it.163 On appeal,
S-K- argued, among other things, that the CNF could not be a terrorist
organization because it used force only in self-defense.164 The BIA disagreed,
explaining that "the fact that Congress included exceptions elsewhere in the
Act ... and that it has not done so in section 212(a)(3)(B), indicates that the
omission of an exception for justifiable force was intentional."1 65 The only relief
for S-K-, according to the BIA, was to seek a waiver from DHS.166 Following
the decision, the Secretary of Homeland Security created a TRIG exemption for
individuals who provided material support to the CNF.167 Congress also named
ten organizations in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 (CAA),
including the CNF, which are not to be considered Tier III organizations.168 The
AG certified the decision in S-K- to himself and remanded it to the BIA for
further action in light of these developments.169
4. Matter of A-C-M-
In the case Matter of A-C-M-, the BIA again stated that there is no self-
defense exclusion to the terrorism bar.170 A-C-M-, a Salvadoran woman, had
been kidnapped by guerillas in El Salvador and coerced into undergoing weapons
training and performing forced labor for the guerillas.171 In immigration court,
161. 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 937 (B.I.A. 2006), overruled on other grounds by Matter of Negusie,
28 I. & N. Dec. 120 (A.G. 2020).
162. Id
163. Id
164. Id at 938-39.
165. Id at 941.
166. Id at 941-42.
167. Exercise of Authority Under Sec. 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
72 Fed. Reg. 9,957, 9,957 (Mar. 6, 2007).
168. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 691(b), 121 Stat. 1844,
2365.
169. In re S-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 289, 290 (A.G. 2007). On remand, the BIA vacated its prior
ruling and granted S-K- asylum in light of the Congressional action exempting CNF. Matter of S-K-, 24
I. & N. Dec. 475, 478 (B.I.A. 2008). Nonetheless, the BIA reaffirmed the precedential nature of its
conclusions in the original In re S-K- decision. Id at 477.




she applied for cancellation of removal.172 The government argued that she was
barred from cancellation for receiving military-type training from the guerillas,
a Tier III organization, and for providing material support to them by cooking,
cleaning, and washing clothes for them.173 The IJ disagreed, finding that the
forced labor was not "material" support as contemplated by the statute or
regulations.7 4 Even if it were, the IJ concluded that A-C-M- did not know that
the labor was material to the guerillas and therefore her actions did not fall within
the parameters of the bar, which requires "commission of an 'act that the actor
knows or reasonably should know, affords material support.'175 The IJ further
characterized A-C-M-'s forced labor as acts of self-defense because had she not
committed these acts, "she would have been killed."1 76 Quoting the Third
Circuit's decision in McAllister, the IJ concluded that acts of self-defense do not
qualify as "terrorist activity" under the INA.177 The IJ also found that A-C-M-
had not received military-type training from the guerillas because she had foiled
their attempts to train her.17 8
In an unpublished and non-precedential decision, the BIA disagreed with
the IJ and found that the applicant was ineligible for cancellation for providing
material support to and receiving military-type training from the guerillas. 179 The
BIA stated the following about a self-defense exclusion to the terrorism bar:
We are unable to find any basis for the Immigration Judge's assertion
that there is a self-defense (or duress) exception i  the statute. Cf
McAllister v. Att'y Gen., 444 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2006); see section 212
(a)(3)(B) of the Act. Rather, Congress intentionally drafted this bar to
relief broadly. And, Congress did not narrow the scope of the bar by
providing for an explicit duress or involuntariness exception. See Alturo
v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 716 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2013); cf section
212(a)(3)(D) of the Act (barring the admission of [noncitizens] affiliated
with totalitarian regimes but expressly exempting those who can
establish that affiliation was involuntary). 80
The BIA remanded the proceedings to the IJ to consider whether A-C-M-
was eligible for any other relief or protection.'8' On remand, the IJ considered
A-C-M-'s eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
172. Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge at 2, Matter of A-C-M-, No. [REDACTED]
(Imnigr. Ct. Dec. 15, 2011).
173. Id at 13-14, 17.
174. Id at 16.
175. Id
176. Id at 18.
177. Id
178. Id at 17.
179. Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals at 2-3, Matter of A-C-M-, No.
[REDACTED] (B.I.A. Jan. 14, 2014).
180. Id (citation omitted).
181. Id at 3.
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CAT.' 8 2 The IJ ultimately found she was ineligible for asylum and withholding
for having provided material support to the guerillas but granted her relief under
the CAT. 83
On appeal, A-C-M- argued that the IJ erred by finding that she was subject
to the material support bar because any assistance she provided the guerillas was
de minimis and thus not "material."184 In the precedential decision, Matter ofA-
C-M-, the BIA rejected that interpretation and held that no quantitative limitation
exists to the material support bar.'85 Applying this standard to A-C-M-'s case,
the BIA found that she provided material support to the guerillas because "if she
had not provided the cooking and cleaning services she was forced to perform,
another person would have needed to do so." 86 Lastly, the BIA held that the IJ
had provided insufficient fact-finding and analysis regarding A-C-M-'s request
for CAT relief and remanded the case to the IJ to conduct further proceedings
and to issue a new decision.187 Significantly, when reciting the procedural history
of the case, the BIA referenced its earlier unpublished decision and stated that it
"found no basis for the Immigration Judge's assertion that there is a self-defense
or duress exception" to the terrorism bars at INA section 212(a)(3)(B). 88
The foregoing cases do not impair the viability of the self-defense
exclusion. While the BIA twice stated that a noncitizen cannot use self-defense
to justify activity that would otherwise qualify as "terrorist activity" under the
INA, these decisions are not definitive for three reasons. First, the BIA was not
confronted with traditional uses of self-defense (such as those used by the
Rohingya villagers or Yazidi women) in either case. In Matter of S-K-, the BIA
considered whether material support charges were appropriately brought against
an applicant who did not herself use force in self-defense but had provided
support to a Tier III organization that, in turn, used force against the government.
In Matter ofA-C-M-, self-defense arose because the IJ argued that if A-C-M- had
not provided the guerillas her services, the guerillas would have killed her.
However, a duress defense would have been more appropriate in this case
because duress generally covers unlawful activity in response to a threat, while
self-defense specifically covers the use of force, and providing services is not
traditionally seen as a use of force. The BIA clearly recognized that it was really
analyzing a duress argument because it equated the two defenses in its decision
182. Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge at 11, Matter of A-C-M-, No. [REDACTED]
(Immigr. Ct. Aug. 8, 2016).
183. Id at 10. For a discussion of CAT relief and its limitations, see supra Part I.B.
184. Matter of A-C-M-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 303, 306 (B.I.A. 2018).
185. Id The BIA's decision inA-C-M- contradicts at least one earlier unpublished decision in
which the BIA had found that an asylum applicant who had given 5000 Burundian francs (roughly four
United States dollars) and abagged lunch to members of a rebel group had not provided material support
to a terrorist organization because four dollars and a bagged lunch could not be considered "material"
under the INA. See HUM. RTS. FIRST, supra note 23, at 33-34.
186. Matter ofA-C-M-, 271. & N. Dec. at 310.
187. Id at 311-12.
188. Id at 304.
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when it stated, "We are unable to find any basis for the Immigration Judge's
assertion that there is a self-defense (or duress) exception in the statute."189
However, as described in Part II.A above and in more detail below in Part III.C.,
duress and self-defense are very different defenses, and therefore should not have
been equated in this manner. Second, the BIA's statements about self-defense in
each case can be characterized as dicta because they did not concern the primary
legal questions at stake in either case.190 Third, the BIA was not presented with
and did not address the strongest argument for why self-defense does apply to
TRIG charges: self-defense is a lawful act that the text of the INA, as currently
written, excludes.
The Third and Ninth Circuits' decisions finding that self-defense is
appropriately applied in immigration cases were rooted in the goals of the INA
and its language, as well as the importance of self-defense in American law. The
Ninth Circuit based its decision on the fact that finding otherwise would
undermine the goals of the INA's asylum provisions by denying "asylum to any
victim of oppression who had the temerity to resist persecution by fighting
back."191 The Ninth Circuit further acknowledged that such a finding would
conflict with the fact that "[t]he right of self-defense is one of the most ancient
in Anglo-American law."192 The Third Circuit found that self-defense applies to
the TRIG specifically because the definition of "terrorist activity" requires that
the activity be "unlawful"; therefore, the definition excludes self-defensive force
as "lawful" force. 193 Part III will expand upon the Third and Ninth Circuit's
reasoning to explain why self-defense should apply to TRIG charges.
III.
THE EXISTING SELF-DEFENSE EXCLUSION UNDER THE INA AND CHALLENGES
TO ACCURATE APPLICATION
Part II of this Article has established that while self-defense is a
fundamental criminal and civil defense under federal law and the laws of each
state, its application to charges brought under the INA is far from clear. This
189. Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, supra note 179, at 2-3.
190. In Matter ofS-K-, the BIA described the primary questions in the case as follows:
(1) [W]hat standards or definition should be used to assess whether the term 'material
support' should be defined narrowly or more broadly; whether it should take into
consideration the mens rea of the provider, as proposed by the respondent; and whether it
includes the type of support provided by the respondent to the CNF; and (2) to what extent,
in light of our precedent, we should factor in an organization's purpose and goals in order to
assess whether an organization, like the CNF, is engaged in terrorist activity.
23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 938 (B.I.A. 2006) (footnote omitted), overruled on other grounds by Matter of
Negusie, 28 I. & N. Dec. 120 (A.G. 2020). The first BIA decision in A-C-M- was unpublished and
therefore holds no precedential value. In the publishedA-C-M- decision, the BIA described the principle
issue as whether "the statutory definition of 'material support' has any limitation based on the extent
and type of support rendered." 27 I. & N. Dec. at 305.
191. Vukmirovic v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2004).
192. Id
193. McAllister v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 444 F.3d 178, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2006).
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Section begins by describing the INA's narrow existing self-defense exclusion
and the challenges immigration adjudicators and pro se individuals will face in
accurately applying this exclusion. It then dismantles general counterarguments
to the application of self-defense in immigration cases. Lastly, this Section
describes why the argument for a self-defense exclusion survives despite the
limited success that the duress defense-another criminal law defense derived
from the common law-has had in the same or similar contexts.
A. The INA 's Narrow Existing Self-Defense Exclusion
When properly interpreted, a self-defense exclusion to the TRIG is, in fact,
available under current immigration law. Before describing the specific actions
that constitute "terrorist activity," there is a crucial opening clause to the INA's
definition of "terrorist activity." This clause states that "terrorist activity" is any
activity "which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or
which, if it had been committed in the United States, would be unlawful under
the laws of the United States or any State)." 94 Force used in self-defense is
justified conduct and thus does not constitute criminal or wrongful conduct.195
Actions taken in self-defense are therefore lawful activity. As such, a noncitizen
charged with engaging in terrorist activity must be allowed to demonstrate that
the activity was lawful self-defense and therefore not terrorist activity.196
In addition to the Third Circuit in McAllister, two other federal circuit
courts appear to agree with this argument. In FH-T v. Holder, the IJ denied
asylum and withholding of removal to the petitioner, an Eritrean citizen, because
he had "engaged in terrorist activity" by providing material support to the
Eritrean People's Liberation Front, which the IJ deemed a Tier III
organization. 197 The Seventh Circuit denied the applicant's petition for
review.198 However, the court noted that its finding in the case "may well have
been different," i.e., in petitioner's favor, had petitioner raised the argument
presented in this Article: that the court cannot deem the petitioner's activities
"terrorist activity" because they were neither unlawful in the place where they
were committed nor unlawful under U.S. law.1 99 The Ninth Circuit agreed with
this interpretation in Khan v. Holder.200 In Khan, the applicant, a citizen of India,
194. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).
195. See supra note 78.
196. In her article arguing that federal common law defenses should be used in immigration
cases, Fatma Marouf wrote, "The most clear-cut situation in which common law defenses should be
considered in removal proceedings involves INA provisions that require the immigration judge to
determine whether [a noncitizen] has engaged in unlawful conduct." Fatma E. Marouf, Invoking Federal
Common Law Defenses in Immigration Cases, 66 UCLA L. REV. 142, 181 (2019).
197. FH-T v. Holder, 723 F.3d 833, 835, 838 (7th Cir. 2013).
198. Id at 836.
199. Id at 838-42.
200. 584 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 2009) ("An action would be lawful within the meaning of
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) if the law of the country in question incorporates international law such that the
conduct in question is no longer 'unlawful' under the country's domestic law .... ").
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argued that the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, an organization dedicated to
the establishment of an independent Kashmir, was not a terrorist organization.201
Khan argued that the definition of "terrorist activity" in the INA incorporates
international law and thus excludes legitimate armed resistance against military
targets.202 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, explaining that an action would be lawful
under the INA's definition of "terrorist activity" only "if the law of the country
in question incorporates international law such that the conduct in question is no
longer 'unlawful' under the country's domestic law." 203 Because Khan made no
argument that India's domestic laws incorporated international law, his argument
based purely on international law failed.204
In addition, USCIS, which adjudicates immigration benefits for noncitizens
who are present in the United States, agreed with this argument at one point. A
2012 instructor's guide on the TRIG states: "No exception for self-defense or
repelling an attack. However, it must be illegal to qualify as terrorist activity.
Therefore, if one engages in self-defense in a lawful manner, then that activity
does not fall within the definition of 'terrorist activity. "'205
But what laws must the adjudicator examine to determine whether an
individual's actions were indeed committed in self-defense? The Seventh Circuit
mentioned only the laws of the country where the activities took place and "U.S.
law." 206 However, the statute as currently written mentions three sets of laws:
(1) the laws of the place where the activity was committed, (2) the laws of the
United States (federal law), and (3) the laws of "any" state.207 An activity is
"terrorist activity" if it is unlawful under any of these three sets of laws
(technically any of these fifty-two sets of laws-the laws of the place where the
activity was committed, federal aw, or the laws of any of the fifty states). This
means that an activity is lawful only if it is lawful under the laws of the place
where it is committed, lawful under federal law, and lawful under the laws of
each of the fifty states.
Applying the current self-defense exclusion presents a practical hurdle for
adjudicators because while federal law and the laws of all fifty states recognize
self-defense, the exact parameters of the defense vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, and may continue to evolve.208 Moreover, because the activity must
be lawful under the laws of each of the fifty-two jurisdictions, an applicant will
201. Id at 778.
202. Id at 781.
203. Id
204. Id
205. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 53, at 12 (emphasis added). A 2017
instructor's guide on TRIG states only that there is "no exception for self-defense or repelling an attack.
However, the act must be illegal to qualify as terrorist activity." U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
TERRORISM-RELATED INADMISSIBILITY GROUNDS (TRIG): INSTRUCTOR GUIDE, BSC 234, at 22
(2017) (on file with author).
206. FH-T v. Holder, 723 F.3d 833, 835, 838-42 (7th Cir. 2013).
207. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).
208. See supra Part IIA-C.
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be subject to the most restrictive elements of self-defense law. Thus, an entire
defense may be unavailable because one jurisdiction continues to apply a
restriction that all other jurisdictions have abandoned. The following list serves
as a rough outline of the questions an adjudicator would need to resolve at a
minimum in order to determine if federal law and the laws of every state justified
the deadly force used in self-defense:
1. Was the force used deadly force?
a) Deadly force: force likely to cause death or great bodily injury.
2. If deadly force was used:
a) Did the actor believe that deadly force was necessary to prevent
the use of deadly force by the aggressor? (subjective belief)
" If yes, move to next question.
" If no, actor's use of deadly force is not justified.
b) Was that belief reasonable? (objective belief)
" If yes, move to next question.
" If no, actor's use of force is not justified.
c) Was the aggressor's use of deadly force against the actor
unlawful?
" If yes, move to next question.
" If no, actor's use of force is not justified.
d) Was the aggressor's use of deadly force against the actor
imminent?
" If yes, move to next question.
" If no, actor's use of force is not justified.
e) Was the force used no more than reasonably necessary?
(proportionality)
" If yes, move to the next question.
" If no, actor's use of force is not justified.
f) Did the actor recklessly place themself in a situation where they
would be forced to use deadly force?
" If no, move to next question.
" If yes, actor's use of force is not justified.
g) Could the actor have avoided the use of deadly force by
surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting claim
of right thereto?
" If no, move to next question.
" If yes, actor's use of force is not justified.
h) Could the actor have avoided the use of deadly force by
complying with a demand that they abstain from performing an
act that they were not obliged to perform?
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" If no, move to next question.
" If yes, actor's use of force is not justified.
3. Did the actor attempt to retreat prior to using deadly force?
a) If yes, actor's use of force is justified.
b) If no, move to next question.
4. If no attempt to retreat was made prior to using deadly force:
a) Was the actor a police officer or private person assisting the
officer at the officer's direction?
" If no, move to next question.
" If yes, actor's use of force without attempting to retreat is
justified.
b) Was there a reasonable opportunity to escape?
" If no, move to next question.
" If yes, actor's use of force without attempting to retreat is
not justified.
c) Could the actor have retreated with complete safety to themself
and to others?
" If no, move to next question.
" If yes, actor's use of force without attempting to retreat is
not justified.
d) Was the actor at their home? ("castle" doctrine)
" If no, move to next question.
" If yes, was the other person a co-occupant?
o If yes, actor's use of force without attempting to
retreat is not justified.
o If no, actor's use of force without attempting to
retreat is justified.
e) Was the actor at their place of work?
" If no, move to next question.
" If yes, was the other person a co-worker and did the actor
know that?
o If yes, actor's use of force without attempting to
retreat is not justified.
o If no, actor's use of force without attempting to
retreat is justified.
f) Was the actor engaged in lawful activity?
" If yes, move to next question.
" If no, actor's use of force without attempting to retreat is
not justified.
g) Was the actor in a place they had a right to be?
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* If yes, move to next question.
* If no, actor's use of force without attempting to retreat is
not justified.
h) Was the actor the initial aggressor or did they provoke the
situation?
* If yes, actor's use of force without attempting to retreat is
not justified.
* If no, actor's use of force is justified.
In addition, the adjudicator must determine whether the law of the country
in which the activity was committed allows the use of deadly force in self-
defense and, if so, the parameters of the defense and whether the actions of the
actor met those parameters. Moreover, as suggested by the court in Khan, the
adjudicator must also investigate whether the law of the country incorporates
international law and, if so, determine whether the actor's use of force meets the
parameters of self-defense under international law. 209
Immigration adjudicators will likely find conducting such a painstaking
analysis time-consuming and burdensome, particularly as most immigration
cases are decided under difficult conditions and tremendous time-pressures.
Refugee officers conduct adjudications overseas for short periods at a time and
often under difficult working conditions, such as within refugee camps, during
which they attempt to interview as many applicants as possible. Due to a huge
increase in the number of asylum applicants and the expansion of expedited
removal and credible-fear processes, the affinrmative asylum system is stretched
to its limits and faces a backlog of over 300,000 cases.2 10 IJs work under perhaps
the most difficult conditions and face the high pressure to decide cases quickly.
Despite an unprecedented backlog of nearly one million cases in immigration
court, a recent report by the American Bar Association's Commission on
Immigration found that immigration courts remain under-resourced and
overworked, and it described the entire immigration court system as "on the
209. See supra notes 202-204 and accompanying text.
210. DORIS MEISSNER, FAYE HIPSMAN, & T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, MIGRATION POL'Y
INST., THE U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM IN CRISIS 4, 15 (2018),
https://www."igrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/MPI-AsylumSystemInCrisis-Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RMR4-9PXH] ("In recent years, a confluence of factors including an increase in the
number of asylum applications, as well as the expansion of expedited removal and credible-fear
processes at the U.S -Mexico border has once again put staggering weight on the system."); Asylum
in the United States: How the Case Backlog Grew to Hundreds of Thousands, USAFACTS (May 5,
2019), https://usafacts.org/articles/asylum-united-states-how-case-backlog-grew-hundreds-thousands/
[https://perma.cc/RQ6R-UB6U].
211. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
ADJUDICATION STATISTICS (2019), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1060836/download




brink of collapse."21 2 Requiring immigration adjudicators to engage in an
analysis that involves examining fifty-two sets of laws under these pressures will
inevitably lead to inaccurate adjudications.
More importantly, such a complicated analysis is a nearly impossible
undertaking for pro se individuals, who currently make up the vast majority of
respondents in immigration court. Nationwide, only 37 percent of non-detained
individuals and 14 percent of detained individuals have legal representation in
removal proceedings based on data from 2007 to 2012.213 Examining fifty-two
sets of laws is a particularly onerous burden to place on a pro se individual as
once the government makes a threshold showing that a terrorism bar may apply,
the burden shifts to the noncitizen to rebut it. 214
The INA's current self-defense exclusion not only requires a time-
consuming and burdensome analysis, but it is also unduly narrow because it
covers self-defense law under both federal law and the laws of all fifty states.
For example, under the current exclusion, an actor who is attacked at home by a
co-occupant has a duty to retreat prior to using deadly force, although it appears
that only one state continues to impose such a requirement.215 Most jurisdictions
abandoned this requirement after recognizing that it adversely impacts victims
of domestic violence.2 16 Globally, domestic violence remains a serious problem
considering one in three women have experienced domestic violence in their
lifetime and 38 percent of murders of women are committed by a male intimate
partner.217 Barring noncitizens from asserting self-defense without retreating
when using deadly force because a minority jurisdiction continues to disallow it
does not seem to serve a purpose. After all, immigration law is federal law, and
federal law itself defines when the force used in self-defense is justified.
212. COMM'N ON IMMIGR., AM. BAR ASS'N, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 2-3
(2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission_onimmigration/2019_refor
mingtheimmigration system volumel.pdf [https://penna.cc/B3PB-UZHE].
213. INGRID EAGLY & STEVEN SHAFTER, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN
IMMIGRATION COURT 2 (2016),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/access_to_counselinimmig
ration _court.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3MJ-35Z3].
214. See Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2016) ("[W]e require a threshold
showing of particularized evidence of the bar's applicability before placing on the applicant the burden
to rebut it.").
215. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2)(b)(2) (2012) ("An individual is not required to retreat
within or from that individual's dwelling ... unless the individual ... is assailed by another individual
who the individual knows also dwells .. . there."); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 821 (N.D. 1983)
(finding no issue with the requirement that an actor must retreat prior to using deadly force if attacked
within her home by a co-occupant).
216. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.





B. Self-Defense Should Apply in Civil Immigration Cases
One argument against asserting the right to self-defense in immigration
cases is that self-defense is a doctrine of criminal law, and immigration cases
have long been considered civil rather than criminal in nature.218 Based on the
distinction between civil and criminal cases, rights guaranteed to criminal
defendants, such as the right to counsel that the Sixth Amendment provides, do
not apply to individuals in removal proceedings.2 19 In addition, as a defense
derived from the common law, one could argue that Congress intended to
exclude the defense in immigration cases because it did not specifically address
self-defense in the INA. These arguments fail because (1) self-defense is more
than just a criminal law defense-it is an inherent or natural right, and a civil
defense; (2) courts have applied other common law doctrines that Congress did
not explicitly mention in the INA in immigration cases; and (3) there is simply
no moral reason for denying noncitizens the right to assert self-defense to TRIG
charges.
1. Self-Defense Should Apply in Immigration Cases Because, as an
Inherent or Natural Right and a Civil Defense, It Is Distinct from
Other Criminal Law Defenses.
First, the right to self-defense is distinct from other criminal law
protections, such as the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel, because it has been
described by state constitutions and by courts as an inherent or natural right. The
Supreme Court itself has suggested that self-defense is a right that "pre-exist[s]"
the written Constitution. 220 Noncitizens, simply by virtue of their humanity, have
the right to use self-defense when confronted with unlawful force. Noncitizens
should also have the right to assert self-defense to justify the use of force when
confronted with charges under the INA because such charges can lead to results
that impact their basic rights as human beings. These results can include banning
an individual from entering the United States, such as a refugee seeking
lifesaving protection from persecution. They can also include permanently
banishing an individual from the United States and separating them from family,
such as a lawful permanent resident (LPR) who calls this country their home.
LPRs, having passed several immigration hurdles to achieve their status, are
"invited to become part of our community, to sink roots-permanent roots-and to
218. See, e.g., Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984)
("A deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not
to punish an unlawful entry .... Consistent with the civil nature of the proceeding, various protections
that apply in the context of a criminal trial do not apply in a deportation hearing.").
219. See, e.g., id. at 1038-39.
220. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). The Supreme Court in Heller was
specifically discussing the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense; however, others have argued
that "the 'primary' right of self-defense predates the Constitution as much as the 'auxiliary' right to have
arms for that purpose," see Miller, supra note 84, at 85 n.6.
650 [Vol. 109:615
TERRORISM
chart out life plans in reliance on enduring rights to remain."22' Moreover, the
right to seek asylum and to family integrity are universally recognized human
rights222 that are also acknowledged under our own federal law. 223 Thus, it makes
little sense to deny noncitizens the right to assert self-defense to charges under
the INA because removal proceedings are civil rather than criminal.
Second, the argument that criminal law protections do not apply to removal
proceedings because they are civil in nature fails because self-defense is not only
a doctrine of criminal law; it is also available as a defense in civil proceedings.224
Third, even if self-defense was a purely criminal law defense, courts have
applied other criminal law defenses in immigration cases. For example, in
Keathley v. Holder, the Seventh Circuit found that noncitizens could assert he
entrapment by estoppel defense in removal proceedings.225 A state official who
knew that Keathley was not a U.S. citizen asked her if she would like to vote,
and she said "yes."226 The state then sent Keathley a voter registration card, and
she voted in a federal election.227 An IJ ordered Keathley removed because he
found that she violated 18 U.S.C. § 611 by unlawfully voting. 228 In immigration
court, Keathley argued that although she had voted, she did not violate § 611
because the state officials' actions gave her the defense of entrapment by
estoppel.229 However, the IJ and the BIA refused to consider her argument
because both believed that entrapment by estoppel, as a doctrine of criminal law,
was irrelevant in immigration proceedings.230 The Seventh Circuit disagreed.
The court explained that because unlawfully voting makes a noncitizen
inadmissible, the IJ had to determine whether Keathley violated the relevant
221. David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections forA liens: The Real
Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 Sup. CT. REV. 47, 102 ("Historically and psychologically,
admission in [the LPR] category amounts to an invitation to full membership in the society and
eventually the polity. Immigrants that is, [noncitizens] selected for lawful permanent resident status
pass through the most rigorous screening our immigration system imposes. But having done so, they are
then invited to become part of our community, to sink roots-permanent roots-and to chart out life plans
in reliance on enduring rights to remain.").
222. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 12, 14.
223. See, e.g., INA § 208(a)(1), 8 USC § 1158(a)(1) (providing that any noncitizen "who is
physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated
port of arrival .. .), irrespective of such [noncitizen's] status, may apply for asylum"); Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) ("[T]he Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.").
224. See Forell, supra note 76. Unlike other bars in the INA, the INA's terrorism bars do not
require a conviction for any offense, so re-adjudication of a self-defense claim that a judge in a criminal
or civil case previously raised and decided will usually not be an issue. In fact, given the breadth of the
INA's terrorism bars and the fact that they do not align with common conceptions of terrorism, the
immigration case will likely be the first time the individual has been confronted with an accusation of
having engaged in terrorism and thus the first time they are asserting self-defense to justify their actions.








criminal statute, "[a]nd the only way to determine whether a person has violated
a criminal statute is to examine both the elements of that law and all defenses
properly raised."231
The Seventh Circuit then went on to explain how self-defense is also
relevant in immigration cases:
Suppose a statute declares that murder is a crime and defines murder as
the intentional killing of a human being. A person who kills in self-
defense, however, is not guilty of murder. A provision in the
Immigration and Nationality Act withholding benefits from [a
noncitizen] who has "committed murder" requires the agency to decide,
not only whether the [noncitizen] killed someone, but also whether the
killing was justified (and thus not "murder"). 232
The court remanded the case to allow the IJ to make factual findings relating to
the entrapment by estoppel defense. 233
2. Self-Defense Should Apply in Immigration Cases Because It Is a Well-
Established Common Law Doctrine and Applying It Would Be
Consistent with the Goals of the INA.
Federal courts have applied other common law doctrines in immigration
cases, despite the fact that the INA does not specifically address these doctrines.
In Duvall v. Attorney General of the United States, the Third Circuit held that
noncitizens can assert the doctrine of collateral estoppel against the government
in removal proceedings.234 Although the INA does not explicitly mention
collateral estoppel or expressly bar the government from relitigating issues
previously decided, the court explained:
The absence of discussion cannot be viewed as dispositive. Congress is
expected to legislate against the backdrop of well-established common
law principles. An accepted common law doctrine should be implied in
a statutory scheme, despite the absence of express authorization, if
application of the doctrine is consistent with the structure and purpose
of that scheme. 235
Applying this standard to the present case, the court first noted that the Supreme
Court has recognized collateral estoppel as a well-established common law
principle.236 The court further found that the structure of the INA is consistent
231. Id
232. Id
233. Id at 646-47. Other criminal protections, such as the rule of lenity, which requires the court
to construe ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the defendant, have also been imported into the
immigration context because of the harshness of deportation. See Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration
Rule ofLenity and ChevronDeference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 519-25 (2003) (describing the origin,
scope, and constitutional status of the rule of lenity in immigration cases).
234. 436 F.3d 382, 390 (3d Cir. 2006).




with collateral estoppel. Under the INA, the court explained that the government
bears the burden of proving that an individual is subject to removal by clear and
convincing evidence, but:
Imposition of this burden would be rendered largely meaningless if the
INA is not interpreted to incorporate principles of collateral estoppel.
Failure to satisfy the burden of proof at one hearing before one
immigration judge would have no effect on the government's ability to
bring successive proceedings in front of successive immigration judges.
The same evidence could be introduced and the same witnesses could
be interrogated, over and over, until the desired result is achieved.237
Taking all of this together, the court concluded that collateral estoppel should
apply in immigration cases because "[i]t would require, consistent with the INA,
that the [government] present all available evidence against the individual during
a single hearing."238
Therefore, like the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the common law right to
self-defense should apply in immigration cases, although the INA fails to
explicitly mention its availability as a defense. As discussed above in Part IIB.,
the Supreme Court has described self-defense as "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition." 239 Thus, like the court found in Duvall with regard to the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, self-defense is a well-established common law
principle.
Permitting a self-defense exclusion to TRIG is also consistent with the
INA's goals, while failing to apply it would be inconsistent with the INA's
asylum and refugee provisions. The court in Duvall came to its conclusion
because it found that applying collateral estoppel in immigration cases is
consistent with the INA, while failing to apply it would be inconsistent with at
least one INA provision.240 The same can be said here. Asylum and refugee laws
seek to protect noncitizens who have suffered persecution, or have a well-
founded fear of persecution, in their home countries on account of a protected
ground and whose governments are unable or unwilling to protect them.24' The
TRIG seek to protect the nation by preventing the entry of noncitizens who have
237. Id. Like the Third Circuit, other courts of appeals have found that the common law doctrines
of estoppel apply in imnigration cases. See, e.g., Oyeniranv. Holder, 672 F.3d 800, 806 (9th Cir. 2012)
(stating that it is "beyond dispute that the doctrine of collateral estoppel (or issue preclusion)" applies in
imnigration cases); Haidan v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1051, 1059 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that res judicata
does apply to immigration proceedings). The BIA has been reluctant to state that estoppel applies in
immigration cases. See, e.g., Matter of Hosseinian, 19 I. & N. Dec. 453, 456 (B.I.A. 1987) ("[Ilt is not
clear that estoppel will lie against the Government in immigration cases."). Other common law defenses
have also been applied in immigration cases. See Marouf, supra note 196, at 158-75 (describing various
common law defenses that have been applied in immigration cases).
238. Duvall, 436 F.3d at 388.
239. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767-68 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
240. Duvall, 436 F.3d at 387.
241. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(42).
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engaged in terrorism or are likely to engage in terrorism after entry.242 Allowing
a noncitizen who has applied for asylum or refugee status to assert self-defense
to a charge of engaging in terrorism would not subvert the goals of the TRIG.
This is because there are already other mechanisms in place within immigration
law to screen out potential security threats.243 Meanwhile, not permitting a self-
defense exclusion to the TRIG would undermine the INA's asylum and refugee
protections by requiring persecuted individuals to face an impossible choice: use
self-defense to survive the persecution but lose the chance of seeking safety in
the United States, or forgo the right to self-defense and face possible death or
serious bodily injury but keep the door to safety open (if they live past the
encounter). Permitting a self-defense exclusion would serve both goals by
keeping asylum and other crucial immigration benefits available to those who
merit them while simultaneously excluding those who pose security threats.
3. Self-Defense Should Apply in Immigration Cases Because There Is No
Principled Reason to Deny Noncitizens the Right to Assert the
Defense.
Finally, there is simply no principled reason to deny noncitizens the right
to present a self-defense justification argument with respect to acts that may
otherwise qualify as "terrorist activity" in the immigration context. Federal law
and the laws of every state universally recognize and permit self-defense as a
complete defense in both civil and criminal proceedings. Discussing the
importance of the defense, one scholar wrote, "Abolition of the defense -
'thereby leaving one a Hobson's choice of almost certain death through violent
attack now or statutorily mandated eath [or life imprisonment] through trial and
conviction of murder later' - seems impossible to imagine. Indeed, if a state
legislature were to abolish the defense of self-defense, it would likely violate the
242. The House Judiciary Committee's report on the Immigration Exclusion and Deportation
Amendments of 1988, which included the definitions of "engage in terrorist activity" and "terrorist
activity" that the Immigration Act of 1990 later adopted, H.R. 4427, 100th Cong. § 2(a) (1988),
explained that "[t]he bill combats international and domestic terrorism by excluding from admission
those who have engaged in terrorist activities or who are likely to engage in such activity after entry to
the United States." H.R. REP. No. 100-882, at 4, 29 (1988).
243. Refugees, for example, go through a rigorous years-longvetting process that includes checks
by U.S. domestic and international intelligence agencies, including the National Counterterrorism
Center and the U.S. Intelligence Community. See Rigorous Refugee Vetting Process for the US., CTR.
FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE, https://www.cvt.org/Refugee-Vetting-Process [https://perma.cc/T4P9-
V5W3]. In addition, an actual terrorist cannot successfully raise self-defense to justify their actions. As
described above in Part II.C.5, aggressors or those who have provoked the use of force against
themselves may not raise self-defense to justify their actions. Moreover, the force used against he person
who invokes the defense must have been "unlawful." See supra Part ILC.1. A victim or a law
enforcement official who uses force against a terrorist (e.g., to stop the attack or to effect an arrest or
detention of the terrorist) would be using lawful force and, therefore, the terrorist would not be able to
assert self-defense to justify force used against these individuals. See supra Part IIC.1.
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United States Constitution."244 A separate conceptualization of self-defense
under immigration law-one requiring noncitizens to submit passively to
unlawful force used against them or lose the chance to seek protection or remain
in the United States-is patently unfair. As described above, subjecting
noncitizens to this impossible choice subverts, rather than furthers, immigration
law policy.
C. Self-Defense Should Apply in Immigration Cases Although the Duress
Defense Has Had Limited Success
Another argument one could raise against a self-defense exclusion to the
TRIG is the fact that a duress defense-a criminal law defense rooted in the
common law and often compared to self-defense-to the "material support" bar
of the TRIG was unsuccessful in the BIA's Matter ofM-H-Z- decision. 245 The
AG also recently vacated the BIA's Matter ofNegusie decision in which it found
a limited duress exception to the persecutor bar.246 This Section will first
summarize the decisions in M-H-Z- and Negusie and will then explain why the
argument for a self-defense exclusion is morally and statutorily stronger than the
argument supporting a duress exception.
1. The BIA 's Duress Decisions
For years advocates, scholars, and even legislators argued for an implied
duress exception to the "material support" bar at INA section
212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). 2 47 The "material support" bar deems inadmissible any
actor who has committed "an act that the actor knows, or easonably should
know, affords material support" to any individual who the actor knows, or
reasonably should know, has committed or plans to commit "terrorist activity,"
or to a terrorist organization, or to any member of such an organization. 248 Matter
ofM-H-Z-, a precedential BIA decision, finally declared that the INA does not
include an implied exception for an individual who has provided material support
under duress.249
M-H-Z-, a Colombian hotelier, applied for asylum based on her fear of the
FARC.25 0 She received threatening messages from the FARC demanding goods
244. DRESSLER, supra note 80, at 223 (quoting Griffin v. Martin, 785 F.2d 1172, 1186 n.37 (4th
Cir.), aff'd and withdrawn, 795 F.2d. 22 (4th Cir. 1986) (enbanc)).
245. 26 I. & N. Dec. 757, 761-64 (B.I.A. 2016).
246. Matter of Negusie, 28 I. & N. Dec. 120, 120-21 (A.G. 2020).
247. See generally Gregory F. Laufer, Admission Denied: In Support of a Duress Exception to
the Immigration and Nationality Act's "Material Support for Terrorism" Provision, 20 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 437 (2006); The "Material Support" Bar: Denying Refuge to the Persecuted?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Hum. Rts. & the L. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 119-20 (2007)
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chainnan, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
248. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV).
249. 26 I. & N. Dec. at 761-64.
250. Id at 757-58.
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and money.2 5 ' After receiving a number of threats, she acceded to their
demands.2 52 Every three months, M-H-Z- supplied products that the FARC
requested.25 3 She also housed government officials at her hotel, which she
believed resulted in more serious threats against her by the FARC.25 4 In
immigration court, M-H-Z- applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and
relief under the CAT.255 The IJ denied her applications for asylum and
withholding after finding that M-H-Z- afforded material support to the FARC, a
terrorist organization.25 On appeal, the BIA agreed with the IJ but remanded the
case so that the IJ could make an explicit determination of whether, in the
absence of the material support bar, M-H-Z- would otherwise be eligible for
relief, which would allow her to request a waiver of the material support bar from
DHS.257 The IJ subsequently held that but for the material support bar, M-H-Z-
would be eligible for asylum.25 8 M-H-Z- filed a petition for review with the
Second Circuit. 259 The Second Circuit remanded the case to the BIA to determine
whether the INA contained an implied exception to the material support bar for
those whose support was supplied under duress.260
Because the INA is silent as to whether a duress exception is implicit in the
material support bar, the BIA looked to the language and design of the statute as
a whole to determine its legislative purpose.261 The BIA noted that the INA
contains a provision rendering any individual inadmissible "who is or has been
a member of or affiliated with the Communist or any other totalitarian party,"
but Congress included an explicit exception to that provision for an individual
who establishes that "the membership or affiliation is or was involuntary. "262
Thus, the BIA concluded that if Congress had intended to make duress an
exception for individuals who provided material support to a terrorist
organization, it would have enacted a similar provision. 263 The BIA found that
Congress's creation of a waiver to avoid the harsh consequences of the bar
further undermined the case for an implied duress exception.264 The applicant
argued that because duress may be a defense to negate culpability in the criminal
context, a duress exception should similarly apply to the material support bar. 265






257. Id at 759. For a discussion of the waiver process for individuals in removal proceedings,
see supra Part IC.
258. Matter ofM-H-Z-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 759.
259. Id
260. Id
261. Id at 761.
262. Id (quoting INA § 212(a)(3)(D)(i), (ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(D)(i), (ii)).
263. Id
264. Id
265. Id at 763.
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The BIA dismissed this argument because "unlike criminal proceedings,
immigration proceedings are civil in nature" and "even in criminal cases, duress
is not always a defense."266
A few years later, in Matter of Negusie, the BIA found that there is an
implied duress exception to the persecutor bar.267 Negusie was forcefully
conscripted into the Eritrean military and subsequently imprisoned for two years
because of his refusal to fight against fellow Ethiopians.268 While incarcerated,
he was subjected to forced labor, beaten, and exposed to the hot sun. 269 He was
then forced to serve as an armed guard in a prison operated by the Eritrean
military. 270 His duties involved guarding prisoners to make sure they did not
escape, including prisoners who were placed in the hot sun as punishment. 271 On
at least two occasions, Negusie disobeyed orders and assisted prisoners, for
which he received verbal reprimands and death threats from his superiors.272
Two of his friends were executed after they tried to escape duty as guards.273
Negusie managed to escape and fled to the United States.274 He applied for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT. 275 The IJ denied his
application for asylum and withholding after finding that Negusie was subject to
the persecutor bar because he guarded prisoners who were tortured and left to
die on account of a protected ground.276 The BIA dismissed Negusie's appeal,
holding that it was immaterial that he was forced to act as a prison guard.277 The
Fifth Circuit affirmed the BIA's decision, but the Supreme Court reversed and
remanded to the BIA. 278 The Supreme Court held that the INA's silence with
regard to a duress exception to the persecutor bar was not conclusive and that the
statute was ambiguous on that point. 279
On remand the BIA recognized a narrow duress exception, finding such an
exception reasonable because it fulfilled the purposes of both the persecutor bar
and the overall purposes of the Refugee Act of 1980,280 the 1951 United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees281 ("the Convention"), and the
266. Id at 763-64.





272. Id at 348, 352.
273. Id at 352.






280. Pub L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended i
22 U.S.C.).
281. Openedfor signature July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
I. & N. Dec. 120 (A.G. 2020).
n scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and
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1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees282 ("the
Protocol").28 3 The BIA first found that the INA's persecutor bar provision
parallels Article 1F(a) of the Convention and that Congress intended the bar to
be interpreted in accord with predecessors to the Convention. 284 The BIA then
explained that Article 1F(a) excludes individuals from protection who have
committed "a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity"
and states that these three crimes are defined in "international instruments drawn
up to make provision in respect of such crimes."285 The BIA went on to find that
Article 1F(a)'s reference to the definitions of "war crimes" and "crimes against
humanity" indicated that the drafters of the Convention chose the term "crime"
intentionally and intended to include international criminal law concepts such as
duress.28 6 The BIA further found that precluding a duress defense would have
serious adverse consequences, where an individual, such as a child soldier, "who
is otherwise fully eligible for asylum or withholding of removal would be barred
from relief for conduct that he or she finds completely abhorrent but that was
undertaken wholly under severe duress, such as imminent threat of loss of life or
subjection to torture."287
Based on formulations of the duress defense from U.S. criminal law and
international law, the BIA held that to meet the minimum threshold requirements
for a duress defense to the persecutor bar, an applicant must establish that they
"(1) acted under an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to
[themself] or others; (2) reasonably believed that the threatened harm would be
carried out unless [they] acted or refrained from acting; (3) had no reasonable
opportunity to escape or otherwise frustrate the threat; (4) did not place
[themself] in a situation in which [they] knew or reasonably should have known
that [they] would likely be forced to act or refrain from acting; and (5) knew or
reasonably should have known that the harm [they] inflicted was not greater than
the threatened harm to [themself] or others."288 The BIA stressed that this
standard "is intended to apply only in rare and extraordinary circumstances," and
ultimately found that Negusie himself failed to meet it. 289 The BIA reasoned that
the death treats Negusie received did not constitute an imminent threat of death
or serious bodily injury and that he had had a reasonable opportunity to escape
or otherwise avoid guarding the prisoners.290
In October 2018, the AG referred the BIA's Negusie decision to himself to
review "[w]hether coercion and duress are relevant to the application of the
282. Openedfor accession Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
283. 27 I. & N. Dec. at 353.
284. Id at 357.
285. Id at 355.
286. Id at 358.
287. Id at 360.
288. Id at 363.




Immigration and Nationality Act's persecutor bar,"291 a move most advocates
saw as the end of the exception.292 In November 2020, advocates' fears were
confirmed when the AG issued a decision vacating the BIA's Negusie decision,
after finding that the persecutor bar contains no exception for conduct committed
under duress or coercion. 293 Like the BIA in M-H-Z-, the AG partially based his
decision on the argument that if Congress had wanted to exclude such conduct it
would have done so explicitly, as it has done in other provisions in the INA. 294
2. The Argument for a Self-Defense Exclusion Survives Although the
Duress Defense Has Failed or Faltered.
One must return to the roots of the two defenses to understand why the
argument that a noncitizen should have a right to assert self-defense to charges
under the INA is stronger than the argument for a duress defense. Under criminal
law, self-defense is a "justification" defense, while duress is an "excuse"
defense; a distinction that has particular importance here.295 Professor George
Fletcher succinctly described the importance of this distinction:
Claims of justification concede that the definition of the offense is
satisfied, but challenge whether the act is wrongful; claims of excuse
concede that the act is wrongful but seek to avoid the attribution of the
act to the actor. A justification speaks to the rightness of the act; an
excuse, to whether the actor is accountable for a concededly wrongful
act. 296
Professor Joshua Dressler described how justified actions imply that no
social harm has occurred, while excused activity concedes social harm:
A defendant who raises a justification defense in a criminal prosecution
says, in essence, "I did nothing wrong for which I should be punished."
To say that conduct is justified is to suggest that something which
ordinarily would be considered wrong or undesirable-i.e., that would
constitute a "social harm,"-is, in light of the circumstances, socially
acceptable or tolerable. A justification, in other words, negates the social
harm of an offense.
291. Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 481, 481 (A.G. 2018).
292. See, e.g., Paul Wickham Schmidt, Gonzo's World: Bogus "Court System" Revealed in All
of Its Disingenuous Ingloriousness Sessions Moves to Trash the "Limited Duress" Defense for
Asylees Before Trump Turns Him Back Into a Pumpkin (After Halloween) - Why Have a BLA if It Is
Only Permitted to Decide Major Issues in Favor of the DHS Position? Matter of Daniel Girmai




293. Matter of Negusie, 28 I. & N. Dec. 120, 120-21 (A.G. 2020).
294. Id at 132-33.
295. See Joshua Dressler, Foreword, Justifications and Excuses: A BriefReview of the Concepts
and the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1167-74 (1987) (examining the differences between
justifications and excuses and arguing that the distinction between the two is important).
296. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.1 (2000).
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An excuse is in the nature of a claim that although the actor has harmed
society, [they] should not be blamed or punished for causing that harm.
The criminal defendant who asserts an excusing defense says, in
essence, "I admit, or you have proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that I
did something I should not have done, but I should not be held
criminally accountable for my actions." Whereas a justification negates
the social harm of an offense, an excuse negates the moral
blameworthiness of the actor for causing the harm. 297
Finally, Professor Marcia Baron described the difference between the two
defenses bluntly when she wrote:
[D]uress is "only an excuse," and this ... brings me to a point that I
hope is uncontroversial: "justified" and "excused" are not quite on a par,
morally. Given a choice between having some action of mine deemed
justified and having it deemed excused, I would rather that it be deemed
justified. 298
Self-defense is thus morally superior to the duress defense because successful
assertion of self-defense proves that the defendant's actions were socially
acceptable, and they committed no social harm. Duress, while negating the
defendant's blameworthiness, means some social harm has occurred. From a
policy standpoint, Congress may have wished to exclude individuals who have
committed acts under duress and not those who have acted in self-defense for
exactly this reason.
Self-defense is not only morally superior to the duress defense; it is also
distinct from it in other ways that reveal its superiority over duress. First, every
jurisdiction in the United States permits the use of force, even deadly force, in
self-protection, and federal and state laws have described the right to self-defense
as an inherent, natural, or inalienable right.299 Second, self-defense is so
fundamental that successful assertion of the defense results in the complete
exoneration of even murder. 300 Third, as a justification defense, the right to self-
defense may be universalized; if an individual is in a situation where they have
the right to use force in self-defense, others may use force on their behalf 301
By contrast, the duress defense has not been described as an inherent right
nor has it been fully embraced. Describing the history of the duress defense, one
scholar wrote, "Our society has a love-hate relationship with the criminal law
defense of duress. Although 'of venerable antiquity,' the defense was frequently
condemned as illegitimate, narrowly defined at common law, comparatively
297. Dressler, supra note 295, at 1161-63 (footnotes omitted).
298. Baron, supra note 295, at 389.
299. See supra Part II.B.
300. WEAVER ET AL., supra note 91, at 459.
301. FLETCHER, supra note 296, § 10.1.1, at 761-62 ("Claims of justification lend themselves to
universalization. That the doing is objectively right (or at least not wrongful) means that anyone is
licensed to do it. The only requirement is that the act be performed for the justificatory purpose ....
Excuses, in contrast, are always personal to the actor; one person's compulsion carries no implications
about whether third parties will be excused if they act on behalf of the endangered defendant.").
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rarely invoked in criminal prosecutions, and not often successfully pleaded."302
In addition, duress is not a defense to an intentional killing under the common
law, by statute in seventeen states today, and by case law in fourteen additional
states3 03 (the BIA specifically noted in M-H-Z- that duress is not always a
defense in criminal cases).304 Therefore, a defendant who kills another even
under threat of death to themself is still guilty of murder. Lastly, as an excuse
defense, duress is personal to the actor and others cannot assert it on their
behalf.305
On the whole, self-defense is simply a better and stronger defense than the
duress defense-it is morally superior, fully embraced by all jurisdictions,
described as essential, capable of universalization, and results in complete
exoneration of even the worst crime one could commit. When self-defense and
duress are viewed in this light, the fact that the duress defense has had limited
success becomes less relevant to the question of whether an individual has a right
to assert self-defense to charges under the INA. Finally, as described above,
unlike the duress defense, self-defense does not have to be implied or read into
the statute. The INA as currently written already excludes self-defense from the
definition of "terrorist activity" under the TRIG. Therefore, the BIA's argument
in M-H-Z- that if Congress wanted to include a duress exception, it would have
done so explicitly,306 does not apply to the self-defense exclusion.
While the INA does currently exclude actions taken in self-defense from
the definition of "terrorist activity," the exclusion is far from perfect as described
in Part IILA. The next Section describes reforms to the TRIG that will better
protect noncitizens who have used force in self-defense.
IV.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
Given the burdensome and narrow nature of the INA's current self-defense
exclusion and the pressures under which immigration adjudicators work,
accurate application of the existing exclusion will prove difficult. Furthermore,
the fact that "terrorist activity" can be any activity that is unlawful under the laws
of any state produces unfair results for at least one particularly vulnerable
population: domestic violence victims. This Section proposes reforms, both
immediate and permanent, to ensure that no noncitizen is denied immigration
relief for exercising their inherent right to self-defense. To tackle the problem
under existing law, USCIS, which houses the Refugee Affairs Division, the
302. Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law ofDuress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its
Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1331-32 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
303. Joshua Dressler, Duress, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW
269, 272 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011); 2 CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 42:3 (2020).
304. Matter of M-H-Z-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 757, 761-64 (B.I.A. 2016).
305. See supra note 301.
306. 26I. & N. Dec. 757, 761 (B.I.A. 2016).
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Asylum Office, and Field Offices where adjustment of status applications are
adjudicated, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which
houses the immigration courts and the BIA, should apply the self-defense
exclusion currently written into the INA. However, because of the limitations of
the exclusion, the Secretary of Homeland Security should issue a TRIG
exemption for force used in self-defense. To fully and permanently protect
noncitizens who have used force in self-defense, Congress should act to amend
the definition of "terrorist activity" and include a definition of self-defense
within the INA based on the MPC and international law.
A. Immediate Solutions
Because a finding that a noncitizen is inadmissible under the TRIG can lead
to dire consequences,307 the government should implement two solutions to
immediately protect noncitizens who have used force in self-defense. First,
immigration adjudicators should apply the law as currently written to find that
self-defensive force does not qualify as "terrorist activity." Second, the Secretary
of Homeland Security should issue a TRIG exemption explicitly exempting self-
defensive force from the definition of "terrorist activity."
As a starting point, immigration adjudicators should interpret the current
INA properly to find that self-defense is already excluded from the definition of
"terrorist activity." To ease the burden of this process and to ensure greater
accuracy in adjudications, the EOIR and USCIS should dedicate staff to compile
self-defense laws under federal law, the laws of each state, and the laws of the
countries from where the majority of their applicants come. Based on these laws,
EOIR and USCIS staff should prepare and disburse a list of questions, similar to
the one in Part IILA., that will guide adjudicators through the self-defense
requirements of each relevant jurisdiction. The staff should update this list of
questions regularly to keep up with changes in the law.
Because the existing self-defense xclusion is so narrow and burdensome
to apply, a better immediate solution would be for the Secretary of Homeland
Security to exercise their discretionary authority under INA section
212(d)(3)(B)(i) to grant an exemption from the TRIG to applicants who have
committed acts in self-defense. The government has used the waiver scheme as
the primary solution thus far to deal with the overbreadth of the terrorism bars.
In fact, various Secretaries of Homeland Security under both Democratic and
Republican administrations have already granted a number of exemptions.308
The promulgation of a TRIG exemption would be most helpful for the Rohingya
villagers and Yazidi women described in the Introduction because refugee
307. See supra Part lB.
308. See supra Part I.C.
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officers (ROs), who have the authority to grant TRIG exemptions,309 would
decide their applications for refugee status.
However, a TRIG exemption solution is imperfect for a number of reasons.
First, the Secretary generally grants an exemption only after many noncitizens
have been denied relief or TRIG issues have indefinitely delayed their cases.
Furthermore, even after the Secretary issues an exemption, it can take years for
DHS to grant a waiver to an applicant.310 Second, the BIA has viewed the
Secretary's exercise of exemption authority as proof that the INA does not
already cover the exempted activity. For example, in Matter ofA-C-M-, the BIA
found that the existence of a waiver for insignificant material support was "clear
evidence that the DHS regards the [material support] bar as extending to the
provision of even 'insignificant' support."3 1' Thus, the Secretary's promulgation
of a self-defense exemption may cause IJs to believe that the INA does not have
a self-defense exclusion that they may apply. Noncitizens in removal
proceedings (such as Adam or Enders) would be forced to wait for a final
removal order before applying for a self-defense exemption. This is because
DHS's current policy requires a final removal order to consider an exemption for
those in proceedings before the EOIR.3 12 Finally, the current or a later Secretary
can always rescind the exemption, once again leaving noncitizens at risk of
losing immigration relief for acts committed in self-defense. Therefore, rather
than relying on this piecemeal waiver approach, there must be more permanent
solutions to address the law and its interpretation.
B. Permanent Solutions
Two permanent solutions, both requiring legislative action, would best
ensure that noncitizens who have engaged in self-defense are not denied
309. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 205, at 43.
310. See generally HUM. RTS. FIRST, supra note 23 (describing how thousands of individuals,
including refugees and LPRs, have had their cases denied or significantly delayed prior to the Secretary's
issuance of TRIG exemptions and delineating the protracted process to obtain a waiver once the
Secretary has issued an exemption).
311. 27 I. & N. Dec. 303, 309 (B.I.A. 2018).
312. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. The government could mitigate this issue if DHS
were to revise its current policy to allow individuals in removal proceedings to apply for an exemption
prior to receiving a final order of removal. This would not be unusual as there are other forms of relief
that only DHS can grant (e.g., U and T nonimmigrant status) that do not require a final order of removal.
See generally U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., PM-602-0029, GUIDANCE FOR COORDINATING
THE ADJUDICATION OF APPLICATIONS AND PETITIONS INVOLVING INDIVIDUALS IN REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS; REVISIONS TO THE ADJUDICATOR'S FIELD MANUAL (AFM) NEW CHAPTER 10.3(i):
AFM UPDATE AD 11-16 (2011) (detailing how USCIS and EOIR should coordinate to identify
applications by people in removal proceedings that only USCIS can grant). The government could
mitigate this issue if Congress were to grant the AG (who in turn were to delegate the authority to the
IJs and BIA members) the authority to grant TRIG exemptions that the Secretaries have issued.
Currently, asylum officers (AOs) and ROs have the authority to grant TRIG exemptions as they are
DHS employees. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMIGR. SERVS., supra note 205, at 43. However, IJs and
members of the BIA, as employees of the U.S. Department of Justice, do not have this same authority
although they are just as, if not more, qualified than AOs and ROs to make these determinations.
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immigration relief. First, Congress should amend the definition of "terrorist
activity" to take out the references to the law of the place where the activity was
committed and the laws of any state, leaving only the federal law. Second,
Congress should create an explicit exclusion to the TRIG that specifies that
actions taken in self-defense are not "terrorist activity." Congress should further
include a definition of self-defense that omits the common law's imminence
requirement, such as the MPC definition, and that incorporates international law
to fully protect all noncitizens who have used force in self-defense.
1. Congress Should Amend the Definition of "Terrorist Activity" so that
Only Federal Law Is Relevant.
Currently, the INA defines "terrorist activity" as any activity "which is
unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if it had
been committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the
United States or any State)."313 Congress should amend the definition of
"terrorist activity" to take out reference to the law of the place where the activity
was committed and the laws of any state, leaving only "the laws of the United
States" (i.e., federal law). Immigration law, as federal law, does look to foreign
and state law in other circumstances, but usually to fill in a gap where federal
law does not have a relevant counterpart. For example, because there is no
federal marriage law, in order to determine whether a marriage is valid for
purposes of immigration law, an adjudicator must determine whether it is valid
under the law of the jurisdiction where the marriage took place.314 However, U.S.
immigration law does not recognize marriages that violate federal public policy,
such as polygamous marriages, or a strong public policy of the couple's state of
residence, such as incestuous marriages, even if these marriages are valid where
they were performed.315 In contrast, federal criminal law already defines
unlawful activity, so there is no need to look to the laws of other jurisdictions
when defining what "terrorist activity" is under our immigration law. 3 16
Moreover, even where immigration law requires an adjudicator to examine state
law (e.g., to determine whether a noncitizen's conviction of a state crime renders
them removable), the adjudicator must determine whether that law fits into a
category as defined by federal immigration law (e.g., whether that state crime is
313. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).
314. See, e.g., In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746, 748 (B.I.A. 2005); Matter of da Silva, 15 I.
& N. Dec. 778, 779 (B.I.A. 1976); Matter of H-, 9 I.& N. Dec 640, 641 (B.I.A. 1962).
315. Chapter 2-Marriage and Marital Union for Naturalization, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS.: POL'Y MANUAL (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-12-part-g-
chapter-2 [https://perma.cc/RDF7-2Y3G].
316. In In re S-K-, the applicant argued that Congress's use of the term "unlawful" rather than
"illegal" was significant. 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 939 n.3, overruled on other grounds by Matter of Negusie,
28 I. & N. Dec. 120 (A.G. 2020). According to the applicant, "lawful" implies an ethical content, while
"illegal" denotes compliance withtechnical rules. Id The BIA was not convinced that Congress intended
different meanings for "unlawful" and "illegal," pointing to the fact that Black's Law Dictionary defines
both terms as against, contrary to, or unauthorized by the law. Id
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an "aggravated felony" as defined by INA section 101(a)(43),317 conviction of
which renders a noncitizen removable under INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) 31 8) 31 9
In fact, looking to the laws of other jurisdictions may lead to unfair results
that place vulnerable populations in greater danger and may violate federal
public policy. As already described in Part IILA, adjudicators must currently
apply the outdated co-occupant exception to the "castle" doctrine because a
single state continues to apply it, even though every other state has abandoned it
in recognition of its harmful impact on domestic violence victims. In addition, if
a country did not allow for the use of force in self-defense under its criminal law,
an applicant who used force against a persecutor to save their life would be
barred from immigration relief, even though the United States recognizes self-
defense as an inherent right.
2. Congress Should Create an Explicit Exclusion to TRIG for Force Used
in Self-Defense.
Congress should create an explicit exclusion to the TRIG that specifies that
actions taken in self-defense are not "terrorist activity." The BIA has read the
TRIG expansively and has been reluctant to find exceptions where Congress has
not included them explicitly, 320 so this solution would best protect noncitizens
who have used force in self-defense. Congress should further amend the TRIG
to include a definition of self-defense. Federal criminal law does not define when
force used in self-defense is justified; instead, federal courts rely on the common
law to fill this gap.321 However, as described in Part IIC, this has resulted in
variations in federal jury instructions on self-defense in some important respects.
Providing a definition of self-defense would avoid this issue and ensure
consistency in the application of the defense.
3. Congress Should Adopt a Definition of "Self-Defense" that Is Based
on the MPC and International Law.
Congress should adopt a definition of "self-defense" that omits the
imminence requirement, like the MPC definition, as the imminence requirement
is unnecessarily restrictive.322 Scholars have criticized the imminence
requirement for its application in domestic violence cases;323 however, that is not
the only situation where its application is problematic. Take, for example, the
317. INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
318. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
319. See, e.g., Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1568 (2017) ("Under that
approach, we ask whether "'the state statute defining the crime of conviction" categorically fits within
the "generic" federal definition of a corresponding aggravated felony."' (quoting Moncrieffe v. Holder,
569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013))).
320. See supra Parts II.D.3, II.D.4.
321. See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
323. See supra Part II.C.4.
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situation of Yazidi women in Iraq held by ISIS as slaves. If these women use
deadly force against their captor to escape when the captor is not immediately
attempting to harm them, the imminence requirement would bar them from using
self-defense to justify their actions. The adjudicator would find that the women
have "engaged in terrorist activity" and would deny their applications for refugee
status in the United States. Professor Paul Robinson described a similar situation
where the application of the imminence requirement seemed unfair:
Suppose A kidnaps and confines D with the announced intention of
killing [them] one week later. D has an opportunity to kill A and escape
each morning as A brings [them] [their] daily ration. Taken literally, the
imminent requirement would prevent D from using deadly force in self-
defense until A is standing over [them] with a knife, but that outcome
seems inappropriate.324
Professor Robinson went on to conclude, "If the concern of the [imminence]
limitation is to exclude threats of harm that are too remote to require a response,
the problem is adequately handled by requiring simply that the response be
'necessary."'325
By adopting a definition of self-defense that does not include the
imminence requirement, Congress can prevent these kinds of unfair results. This
is not as radical a recommendation as it may seem when compared to the drafters
of the MPC also abandoning the imminence requirement. The MPC's provision
on the use of non-deadly force in self-defense reads, "the use of force . . . is
justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for
the purpose of protecting [themself] against the use of unlawful force by such
other person on the present occasion."326 "Immediately necessary . . . on the
present occasion" may seem like an imminence requirement, but the commentary
explains that it is not. The MPC's self-defense provision focuses on the need to
use force, rather than on the imminence of the harm:
The actor must believe that [their] defensive action is immediately
necessary and the unlawful force against which [they] defend[] must be
force that [they] apprehend[] will be used on the present occasion, but
[they] need not apprehend that it will be used immediately. There would,
for example, be a privilege to use defensive force to prevent an assailant
from going to summon reinforcements, given a belief that it is necessary
to disable [them] to prevent an attack by overwhelming numbers-so
long as the attack is apprehended on the "present occasion." The latter
words are used in preference to "imminent" or "immediate" to introduce
the necessary latitude for the attainment of a just result in cases of this
kind.327
324. ROBINSON, supra note 78, § 13 1(c)(1) (footnote omitted).
325. Id.
326. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (Westlaw through 2019 Annual Meeting of American Law
Institute).
327. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS. pt. I, § 3.04 cmt. 2(c) (AM. L. INST. 1985).
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Moreover, the MPC provision on the use of deadly force in self-defense
omits even the "immediately necessary . .. on the present occasion" language,
permitting deadly force where it is simply necessary. The MPC allows deadly
force when "the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect [themself]
against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled
by force or threat."328
Some states follow the MPC approach, using the "immediately necessary"
language to describe when non-deadly force is justified but permitting the use of
deadly force when it is only necessary. 329 For example, in Nebraska, "[t]he use
of deadly force shall not be justifiable . . . unless the actor believes that such
force is necessary to protect [themself] against death, serious bodily harm,
kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat."330 Similarly,
other states have retained the common law's imminence requirement (or a
version of it) for non-deadly force, but allow the use of deadly force simply when
it is necessary.331 Indiana, for example, permits deadly force when a "person
reasonably believes that that force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury
to the person . . . or the commission of a forcible felony." 332 Some states have
abandoned the imminence requirement altogether, simply allowing the use of all
force when it is necessary.333 Minnesota, for example, permits "reasonable
force . . . when used by any person in resisting . . . an offense against the
person."334
The impermissible force that is described in the definition of "terrorist
activity" ("the use of any biological or chemical agent, nuclear weapon or device,
explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device with the intent to
endanger the safety of one or more individuals"335) and that Adam, the Yazidi
women, and the Rohingya villagers used in self-defense, was deadly force.
Therefore, Congress's definition of self-defense need only cover when the use
of deadly force is permitted. Given the issues with the imminence requirement,
Congress should follow the lead of the MPC and the states described above to
permit the use of deadly force simply when it is "necessary." Federal jury
328. Supra note 99.
329. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 464(a) (2015); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-304(1) (2020);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1409(1) (2016).
330. NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1409(4).
331. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21 (2019); IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(c) (2020); LA. STAT.
ANN. § 14:19 (2016); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07 (2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 733 (2018); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2305 (LEXIS through Act 1 of 2021 Sess.). In contrast, Wisconsin permits non-
deadly force when the actor reasonably believes it is necessary but retains the imminence requirement
for the use of deadly force. WIS. STAT. § 939.48 (2019-20).
332. IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(c).
333. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.06 (2020). Afew states permit homicide both when it is simply
necessary and also when the harm is imminent. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 197(1)-(2) (West 2014
& Supp. 2020); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-7(A)-(B) (2020).
334. MINN. STAT. § 609.06.
335. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V), 8 USC § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V).
2021 ] 667
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
instructions describing when deadly force is permissible already follow this
approach. 336
Finally, Congress should incorporate international law into the definition
of self-defense. Self-defense, as described under federal law, is an individual
right, and thus it does not apply as neatly to the cases of Enders and S-K- (unlike
Adam and the Rohingya villagers and Yazidi women described in the
Introduction). Enders and S-K- were both members of organizations that had
used self-defense against governments seeking to suppress their ethnic groups.
They were deemed inadmissible under the TRIG because of their group's use of
self-defense, not because of their individual use of self-defense. Unlike self-
defense under federal law, Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (the core
international humanitarian law treaties), which the United States has not ratified,
permits the use of force in "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the
exercise of their right of self-determination."337 Enders and S-K- were both
members of ethnic minorities that had been the victims of systematic human
rights violations by oppressive regimes. They joined or helped organizations that
fought for self-determination for their communities, and thus, these
organizations' use of force was lawful under international law. 338 Incorporating
international law into the definition of self-defense would ensure that the
government does not deny immigration relief to individuals like Enders and S-
K- simply because the federal definition of self-defense does not easily apply to
their circumstances.339
336. See supra notes 111-113; MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT § 9.04 (JUD. COMM. ON MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 2017) ("If aperson reasonably believes that force is necessary to protect [themself]
[anotherperson] from what [they] reasonably believe[] to be unlawful physical harm about to be inflicted
by another and uses such force, then [they] acted in [self defense] [defense of
1." (second, sixth, and seventh alterations in original)).
337. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
17,512; see also Aleksandar Marsavelski, The Crime of Terrorism and the Right of Revolution in
InternationalLaw, 28 CONN. J. INT'L L. 243, 247 (2013) ("Contemporary international law incorporates
one aspect of the right of revolution under the right of self-determination, which permits the use of force
against colonial domination, alien occupation and racist regimes."); Catherine Bruce, Angus Grant &
Catherine Reynolds, Out of the Fire and into the Pot: The Eritrean Liberation Movement, the Right to
Self-Determination and the Over-Breadth ofNorth American Immigration Security Provisions, 25 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 859, 860 (2011) ("International aw does not prohibit the use of armed struggle to achieve
self-determination by people subject o alien domination. In the immigration context, applying this
principle would ensure that those whose only 'crime' was participation in legitimate struggles for self-
determination are not rendered inadmissible .... ").
338. See, e.g., Ethiopia: The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Including Origin, Mandate,
Leadership, Structure, Legal Status, and Membership; Treatment of Members and Supporters by
Authorities (2014-2015), IMMIGR. AND REFUGEE BD. OF CAN. (May 2015), https://irb-
cisr.gc.ca/en/country-information/rir/Pages/index.aspx?doc=455883 [https://perma.cc/6UVF-UPB6].
339. Adam's self-defense unit used force against both armed opposition groups and the Gaddafi
regime. The force against the Gaddafi regime was used in the context of a revolution against a
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The proposals suggested here are reasonable as both Congress and the
Executive Branch are aware of the overbreadth of the TRIG and have taken
actions to temper the provisions. For example, Congress has amended the TRIG
when necessary to resolve unfair results. In the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act, Congress amended the INA provision that deems
a noncitizen inadmissible for being a member of a terrorist organization to
require that the noncitizen knew or should have known that the organization of
which they are a member is a terrorist organization in order for them to be
inadmissible because of such membership.340 In the CAA, Congress, at the
request of the Bush administration, amended the TRIG again. This time,
Congress amended INA section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) to give the Secretaries of
Homeland Security and State discretion not to apply nearly all of the terrorism-
related provisions.341 Prior to this amendment, the Secretaries had very narrow
exemption authority, e.g., to exempt individuals from the material-support bar.
The CAA also provided that a number of specific groups could not be considered
terrorist organizations under the INA. 342 After receiving this expanded authority,
the Secretaries, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, have
issued a number of exemptions.343 In fact, in early 2019, the Trump
administration's Secretary of State granted a group-based exemption to the
Lebanese Forces and Kataeb Militias. 344 Congress can and should also amend
the TRIG as suggested in this Article to ensure that acts taken in self-defense are
no longer deemed "terrorist activity" by immigration adjudicators.
dictatorship, but the Gaddafi regime was not a colonial or alien occupier or racist against Adam's ethnic
group. See Won Kidane, The Terrorism Bar to Asylum in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and
the United States: Transporting Best Practices, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 300, 307-11 (2010) (describing
how whether the right to self-defense "extends to resistance movements opposing tyranny where there
is no racially based oppression or alien domination continues to be a subject of great controversy" under
international law). However, incorporating international law into the definition of self-defense may still
help individuals such as Adam. The force used by Gaddafi's regime against Adam (and his town) was
unlawful because intentional attacks against civilians are a "war crime" under international law. See
AMNESTY INT'L, MISRATAH - UNDER SIEGE AND UNDER FIRE 31-32 (2011),
https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/mde19019201len_11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2HZ8-LU7Q].
340. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 355, 110 Stat. 3009-546, -644 (1996) (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1182).
341. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 691(a), 121 Stat. 1844, 2364
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182).
342. Id § 691(b), 121 Stat. at 2365.
343. See supra Part I.C.
344. Exercise of Discretionary Authority Under Section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act; Notice of Determination, 84 Fed. Reg. 18,108, 18,108 (Apr. 29, 2019) (relating to the
Kataeb militias); Exercise of Discretionary Authority Under Section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration






Immigration laws aimed at excluding and removing noncitizens who have
engaged in terrorism or intend to engage in terrorism after entering the United
States are without a doubt logical. However, interpreting the TRIG to bar
persecuted noncitizens from receiving immigration relief for taking actions in
self-defense-the very acts necessary to survive persecution-contradicts both
the elevated status given to self-defense under state and federal law and the
United States' longstanding commitment to providing humanitarian protection
to individuals fleeing persecution. Interpreting the TRIG to ban or banish other
noncitizens likewise contradicts our values. For example, removing LPRs-
noncitizens who have been invited to live permanently in our American
community-from this country for taking actions to protect themselves makes
little sense given the high status of LPRs under our immigration laws. This
Article attempts to demonstrate that the immigration law's goals of protecting
the country from terrorists and providing safety to persecuted noncitizens and
others need not be in conflict. 45
Resolving this issue is particularly important in our current historical
moment. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reports that there
are an unprecedented 79.5 million people, including 26 million refugees and 4.2
million asylum seekers, around the world who have been forcibly displaced from
their homes because of conflict, persecution, and civil strife and are in need of
safety and protection.346 Refugees and asylees, like Adam and Enders, have
endured unimaginable persecution, often involving torture, physical abuse, rape,
death threats, and prolonged detentions. For too long, the United States has
denied immigration relief to these people for using force in the exercise of their
inherent right to self-defense. Congress should pass the necessary reforms
described in this Article to ensure that our own immigration laws do not continue
this unacceptable cycle of victimization.
345. In fact, the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees specifically
excludes individuals who have committed some serious crimes from protection, even if they otherwise
meet the definition of a refugee. U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 281,
art. iF.
346. See Figures at a Glance, U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, https://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/figures-at-a-glance.html [https://penna.cc/HV9K-3ZFS].
670 [Vol. 109:615
